tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-86970608002426658612024-03-19T06:04:27.541-04:00The Past isn't PastMark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.comBlogger203125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-2949233654379609752019-06-04T17:37:00.000-04:002019-06-04T17:37:07.953-04:00Why Trump's Obstruction Matters: It May Be the Reason Mueller Could Not Establish Conspiracy<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal">
Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s public statement last week amounted
to a simple plea: read what I wrote. The collective American failure to do so
made that plea necessary.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It is not entirely the fault of the public. Attorney General
William Barr deliberately mislead all of us about what Mueller wrote before any
of us had a chance to read the report. Barr told us what to think, and many of
us left it at that. Since the release of the redacted version, however, the
evidence has been there and has been largely ignored.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjORJVIfJF4P41uN5J61YgV1GUxikHLmivp_k9hbXEMEhFv-sRFlSiyQG2bKDj3x0GAbYHuwT8nDWGzr1_uiCK92AMBa0rMW7KjhyqGMIN_Dm83x3q9MvAZPUeTCQRvB60_qwiwMKcuC8xU/s1600/Mueller.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="451" data-original-width="809" height="221" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjORJVIfJF4P41uN5J61YgV1GUxikHLmivp_k9hbXEMEhFv-sRFlSiyQG2bKDj3x0GAbYHuwT8nDWGzr1_uiCK92AMBa0rMW7KjhyqGMIN_Dm83x3q9MvAZPUeTCQRvB60_qwiwMKcuC8xU/s400/Mueller.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
The public generally relies on the press to interpret such
documents, and the American news media has not done a particularly good job in
this case.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The press has been relatively responsible in its treatment
of Volume 2, which lays out the case that Donald Trump committed multiple acts
of obstruction of justice. As Mueller made clear in his public statement, Trump
only escaped indictment due to Department of Justice policy against indicting a
sitting president. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The problem is that the focus on the obstruction in Volume 2
case has led us to ignore what precisely Trump was obstructing. The
conventional wisdom on Watergate is that it was the cover-up that got Nixon, as
if that unusually bright man stupidly committed obstruction of justice for no
good reason. But historians of Watergate know well that Nixon covered up for a
perfectly good reason: to avoid exposing his own criminal activity. The same is
likely true here, and we have thus far failed to appreciate it.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In my reading, the greatest failing in the public and press
understanding of the Mueller report pertains to Volume 1 on the investigation
into Russian interference. Trump, of course, has repeatedly (and falsely)
claimed that it concluded that there was “no collusion.” Trump’s lies are to be
expected. What has been far worse has been the failure of the press (and
members of Congress) to convey accurately what Mueller does say in Volume 1—and
how what it actually says adds greater weight to the damning material in Volume
2.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In short, I think the report tells us that the Trump
Campaign may well have conspired with the Russian government, but Trump’s
obstruction prevented the investigation from proving it.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The failure of the press to communicate the real substance
of the report cannot be blamed entirely on Barr. He accurately quoted the
report in his initial letter: “[T]he investigation did not establish that
members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian
government in its election interference activities.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Unfortunately, the careful language of the report—“did not
establish”—is easy to misinterpret, and it became something else in many press
accounts: that the report found “no evidence” of collusion. The New York Times,
CBS News, and NPR all framed the issue that way. Trump’s defenders consistently
have repeated that lie. Anyone who has read Volume 1 (as I have) knows that the
report explicitly says it <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">did</i> find
evidence of conspiracy—but that the evidence was “not sufficient.” Mueller’s
public statement made a point of saying the Special Counsel’s Office (SCO)
concluded not that there was no evidence, but “that there was <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">insufficient </i>evidence to charge a
broader conspiracy.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
So what does that mean? The report explicitly tells us: “A
statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not
mean there was no evidence of those facts.” (Vol. 1, p. 2) In short, the report
tells us that there <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">was</i> evidence of
conspiracy with the Russian government, but that it did not meet this high
legal standard: “whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to
obtain and sustain a conviction.” (Vol. 1, p. 8) It may be worth noting that
modifier “admissible”—it seems to suggest that there is evidence that would not
be admissible in court that would have been sufficient to establish a
conspiracy.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Language matters. A careful reading of the report reveals
that the SCO used a variety of phrases to describe what it did or did not find.
When it found “no evidence,” it says so: “The investigation did not identify
evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA [Internet
Research Agency, the Russian government’s social media manipulator].” (Vol., 1,
p. 4) The report also forthrightly states: “The investigation did not find
evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any such Clinton emails.” (Vol. 1,
p. 61) Also: “The investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign
passed or received any messages to or from the Russian government through CNI
[Center for the National Interest] or [its director Dimitri] Simes.” (Vol. 1,
p. 103)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
These examples make it impossible to argue that “did not
establish” means the same thing as “did not find evidence.” That misreading,
however, has been immensely useful to Trump and his defenders.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A major consequence of the failure to understand Volume 1
and its argument is that the damning evidence of obstruction of justice by
Trump in Volume 2 seems less significant than it should. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Barr himself has absurdly claimed that Trump’s obstruction
behavior can be excused because he had been falsely accused: “If the president
is being falsely accused, which the evidence now suggests that the accusations
against him were false, and he knew they were false, and he felt that this
investigation was unfair, propelled by his political opponents, and was
hampering his ability to govern, that is not a corrupt motive for replacing an
independent counsel.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A fair reading of Volume 1 cannot sustain Barr’s claim “the
evidence now suggests that the accusations against him were false.” The report
does not conclude that the conspiracy charge was false. But the lie that Volume
1 found “no evidence” of conspiracy quite nicely serves Barr’s end (I give the
press the benefit of the doubt that their error was due to laziness; Barr is
too experienced a lawyer for that.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
According to Barr’s contorted defense, there can be no
obstruction if there was no underlying crime. But Volume 1 makes clear two
things: 1) there <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">was</i> an underlying
crime of Russian interference in the election (a point Mueller hammered home
not once but twice in his public statement) and 2) the failure to establish a
second crime (a conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian
government) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">may be due precisely to Trump’s
obstruction of justice</i>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In the Volume 1 summary of charging decisions, the report
states that the evidence of conspiracy was not sufficient but does not leave it
at that—it explains <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">why</i> the evidence
was insufficient: “several individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign lied
to the Office, and to Congress … Those lies impaired the investigation of
Russian election interference.” (Vol. 1, p. 10) In addition, the “investigation
did not always yield admissible information or testimony” due to Fifth
Amendment claims, attorney-client privilege, and First Amendment protections of
journalists. Even worse, some evidence was destroyed or hidden: “some of the
individuals we interviewed or whose conduct we investigated—including some
associated with the Trump Campaign—deleted relevant communications or
communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature
encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data.” (Vol. 1, p.
10)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The significance of that last point cannot be overstated. It
is crucial to the SCO’s inability to establish a conspiracy: “the Office was
not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to
contemporaneous communications.” (Vol. 1, p. 10) In other words, they had <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">testimony</i> that showed conspiracy, but
the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">documentary</i> evidence that might
have met the legal standard for conspiracy was destroyed or unavailable.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Due to these limitations on the investigation, the report
states unequivocally that its account of Russian interference, in particular
the possible conspiracy between the Trump campaign and Russian government, is
not definitive: “the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the
unavailable information would shed additional light on (or cast in a different
light) the events described in the report.” (Vol. 1, p. 10)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
That statement could cut either way, of course. Perhaps the
“unavailable information” would make the actions of Trump campaign officials
look completely innocent. Given the entirety of the introduction (and the above
quotation is the final sentence of that introduction), it seems to me likely
that the report is saying that while the investigation did not establish a
criminal conspiracy, its authors are not confident that there was not one.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This reading of Volume 1 casts the findings of Volume 2 in
an entirely “different light.” The standard reading of the report is that the
two volumes are entirely separate. Given that the report is organized that way,
that’s natural, especially when we consider that Volume 1 says the
investigation did not establish a criminal conspiracy and Volume 2 then goes
further and explicitly refuses to exonerate Trump on obstruction of justice.
They seem to come to two separate conclusions on two separate subjects. Barr
has adroitly used that fact to try to neutralize Volume 2.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
If we read the two volumes as one story, however, another
picture emerges: The investigation failed to establish conspiracy in part
because Donald Trump obstructed justice by dangling a pardon to Paul Manafort.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The key unknown in Volume 1 is the precise nature of
Manafort’s contacts with Russians during the campaign. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The description of the roadblocks the
investigation encountered establishing conspiracy closely fits Manafort’s case.
“Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and
communications with Konstantin Kilimnik.” (Vol. 1, p. 10) The report notes that
it was not “able to gain access to all of Manafort’s electronic communications
(in some instances, messages were sent using encryption applications).” (Vol.
1, p. 130)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The investigation established that Manafort shared internal
polling data with Kilimnik, but could not ascertain with certainty why. Thus,
it uses the same language on this question as it does on conspiracy in general:
“The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with
the Russian government on its election-interference efforts.” (Vol. 1, p. 131)
(Given the earlier description of what that phrase means, this means that they <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">did</i> have evidence—likely testimony from Rick
Gates—but that they could not corroborate it with documents.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Since we know that the Russian election activities involved
social media manipulation to help Trump and hurt Clinton, it is no great
stretch to imagine the answer to that question—Manafort gave Kilimnik the
polling data to aid in precisely targeting Russian election-interference
activities—but as a legal matter the SCO was stymied. It seems likely that the
cooperation agreement with Manafort led the investigators to believe that they
would finally get answers to that fundamental question.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Then, in one of the strangest twists in the entire saga,
Manafort violated the agreement and lied to them. Why?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This is where the two volumes come together. Most accounts
of the obstruction case have focused (as Barr did) on Trump’s efforts to have
Mueller fired. Buried amidst the multiple and varied instances of Trump’s
obstructive actions, however, is the more significant section on Manafort. Its
conclusion is among the strongest statements in the report: “Evidence
concerning the President’s conduct towards Manafort indicates that the
President intended to encourage Manafort not to cooperate with the government.”
(Vol. 2, p. 132)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Trump “discussed with
aides … whether Manafort knew any information that would be harmful to the
President.” (Vol. 2, p. 123) The obstruction activity even continued after
Manafort’s plea agreement (Vol. 2, p. 127), and Trump continued to hint at
pardon after Manafort’s failure to abide by the agreement (which practically
insured significant jail time for Manafort) became publicly known. (Vol. 2, p.
128)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Unlike other instances, in which the report bends over
backwards to give Trump the benefit of the doubt (as in whether or not he was
trying to influence the jury in Manafort’s trial), the report states “the
evidence supports the inference that the President intended Manafort to believe
that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with the
government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.” (Vol. 2, pp.
132-133)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Put all of this together, and the report seems to me to be
saying that there might well have been a conspiracy between the Trump campaign
and the Russian government, that the key figure in that conspiracy was Paul
Manafort, and that Trump’s obstruction of justice was instrumental in blocking
the investigation’s ability to establish that conspiracy by convincing Manafort
to lie to investigators.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
When we strip away Mueller’s careful legal language, that’s
what remains.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Why did Mueller come out and make that public statement last
week? Why did he reemphasize the crime of Russian election interference? My
reading of the complete report leads me to conclude that he was telling us that
Trump’s obstruction matters, not just as a simple matter of principle (as most
have interpreted it) but because that obstruction blocked the investigation and
may well have successfully hidden a conspiracy between the campaign and the
Russian government.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]-->
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>JA</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
<w:UseFELayout/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="true"
DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="276">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="59" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]-->
<!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:Cambria;
mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<!--StartFragment-->
<!--EndFragment--><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
As Mueller said, that “deserves the attention of every
American.”<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-46374940701896170932018-07-24T21:17:00.000-04:002018-07-24T21:17:38.726-04:00C-SPAN 3 Interview<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
In April, I gave a paper at the Organization of American Historians conference in Sacramento, titled "The Air War: How the Great Debate Over World War II Revolutionized Politics on the Radio."<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKu_xHLIYJUfJL_WSDeINOa8Ssq2RaUonl5S08iWYmm8ghrA2m62F5hxJkzpbFc8Ji8-r7-tDY2k1jAbv_Msy-8EErjw94RS12MchxfvfFj5WhB2KaU1gx30fSjqblIusseMs7gWV6_B1D/s1600/C-SPAN+3.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="895" data-original-width="1600" height="355" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKu_xHLIYJUfJL_WSDeINOa8Ssq2RaUonl5S08iWYmm8ghrA2m62F5hxJkzpbFc8Ji8-r7-tDY2k1jAbv_Msy-8EErjw94RS12MchxfvfFj5WhB2KaU1gx30fSjqblIusseMs7gWV6_B1D/s640/C-SPAN+3.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
C-SPAN 3 interviewed me at the conference, and the interview recently aired. You can watch it below.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?444011-11/radio-world-war-ii-era-politics&start=33" target="_blank">https://www.c-span.org/video/?444011-11/radio-world-war-ii-era-politics&start=33</a></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-66483849703615533232018-02-10T13:01:00.000-05:002018-02-10T13:05:50.995-05:00The Nunes Memo, “Bias,” and the Skills of the Historian<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
[<i>This post was originally published on <a href="http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/154059" target="_blank">HNN</a>.</i>]<br />
<br />
It struck me while reading the instantly infamous <a href="http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/read-the-gop-memo/2746/">Nunes memo</a>
that we’d all be better off if we were all trained as historians.<br />
<br />
OK, I already thought that. Maybe it is just because I have
been working on the syllabus for my historical research methods class, but the
memo and the knee-jerk reactions to it both prove to me once again how
important it is to have the historian’s understanding of how to use primary
source information.<br />
<br />
The entire “argument” (such as it is) depends on the idea
that a FISA warrant based—to any extent—on the so-called Steele dossier is
inherently tainted, because the research done by the author, former British
intelligence agent Christopher Steele, was paid for at some point by Democrats.
Since the warrant targeted Carter Page, who had been part of the Trump
campaign, the motive of the funders (not the researcher, it bears noting) to
get “dirt” on Trump somehow discredits everything Steele found.<br />
<br />
The memo contains not a single argument that the evidence
used to obtain the warrant against Carter Page was actually false—only that it
is somehow untrustworthy due to the alleged motive behind the research that
produced the evidence.<br />
<br />
In history, we deal with this problem all the time. We
uncover evidence in primary sources, and must judge its credibility. Do we have
reason to believe that the person who produced the evidence might have an
agenda that should cause us to doubt the veracity of the evidence? What do we
do if the answer to that question is “yes,” or even “maybe”?<br />
<br />
I do a primary source exercise in my methods class that does
just this: presents the students with conflicting primary source accounts of an
event. I then explain why the people who produced the evidence might have
self-serving reasons for portraying the event in a particular light. <br />
<br />
Most students, when first faced with this dilemma,
immediately say “bias!” and dismiss the evidence as worthless. That is the
reaction the Nunes memo seems intended to produce among the general public. <br />
<br />
But that is not how the historian reacts. Yes, the source of
the evidence may have some bias. That does not, however, by itself mean that
the information is false. It does mean that when weighing its validity, the
historian must look for other, independent, corroborating evidence before trusting
it.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
It seems likely that is what the officials who used the
Steele dossier to obtain the FISA warrant did: they compared what Steele wrote
to other information they had about Carter Page to see if it lined up.<br />
<br />
<br />
People defending Nunes are pointing to this line in the memo
as evidence that the allegedly flawed evidence from the dossier was used to unfairly target
Page for surveillance: “Deputy Director McCabe testified before the committee
in December 2017 that no surveillance warrant would have been sought from the
FISC without the Steele dossier information.” <br />
<br />
While there is some dispute about whether this is an
accurate characterization of McCabe’s testimony, it is hardly a smoking gun
that proves the warrant had no factual, evidentiary basis. <br />
<br />
Let’s take the memo’s assertion about McCabe’s testimony at
face value and assume it is completely accurate. If, as seems likely given
<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-trump-aide-carter-page-was-on-u-s-counterintelligence-radar-before-russia-dossier-1517486401">other reporting on Page</a>, the intelligence community had other, independently-sourced
evidence causing them to suspect Page of suspicious contacts with Russian
intelligence, then Steele’s information may have been the corroboration they
needed to move forward with the warrant. Thus, there would not have been a
warrant without it.<br />
<br />
But the logic of that also works <i>the other way</i>: if <i>all</i> they
had was the Steele dossier information—without corroboration—then there also would
be no warrant. Unless McCabe said that the warrant request was based <i>solely</i> on
the Steele information, this actually shows that the information in the dossier
had corroboration that legitimately outweighed any potential taint due to the
funding source of Steele’s research. It shows that the charge that the FBI
failed to take into account any potential political bias is false. And then the
whole flimsy assertion behind the memo falls apart completely.<br />
<br />
If you’ve been trained in evaluating evidence, this way of
thinking comes naturally. The uninformed, however, fall for the
incredibly
flawed assertions in the Nunes memo. People who don’t understand
anything about
law or evidence dismiss the dossier as the “fruit of the poisonous
tree,” but
in fact that phrase refers to evidence that is obtained illegally. It
has
nothing to do with potential bias. The charge is not that Steele's
evidence was obtained illegally, but that it is was somehow "biased" and
thus untrustworthy. Every legal case, like every historical
case, involves judging the trustworthiness of evidence. Yes, you need to
consider from whence the evidence comes. But you do not dismiss it out
of hand just because there might be some whiff of “bias” from the source
of the information.<br />
<br />
That’s a skill that historical training imparts. The inability of a large number of Americans—including ostensibly
well-educated ones—to understand that shows how much we suffer from our historical illiteracy.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-16954106447042556552017-05-30T13:15:00.000-04:002017-05-30T13:15:05.777-04:00Why Trump's Snub of NATO Matters<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal">
[<i>This post was first published on HNN: http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153934#sthash.nbZ5tfZy.dpuf</i>]</div>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]-->
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>JA</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
<w:UseFELayout/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="true"
DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="276">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="59" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]-->
<!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:Cambria;
mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<!--StartFragment-->
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<!--EndFragment--><div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Donald Trump went to a NATO meeting last week and never
explicitly stated his commitment to Article 5, which states that an attack on
one member is an attack on all.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Why is this such a big deal? Because he’s undermining U.S.
national interests.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7oL69YE03Hj1QDdU9y4V1QvmENEoihlHSS6NyaqTSXDQHGkfN1eSUmtOwV0sJnCbFTI4Rib-SxExtjFRIil9TfEqeAIE3dmqsP9lzEAd_dqkS8l2_LeQoLhFloz7NXMWDaqdX-zSn8rY-/s1600/153934-153934-trump-europe.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="435" data-original-width="900" height="307" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7oL69YE03Hj1QDdU9y4V1QvmENEoihlHSS6NyaqTSXDQHGkfN1eSUmtOwV0sJnCbFTI4Rib-SxExtjFRIil9TfEqeAIE3dmqsP9lzEAd_dqkS8l2_LeQoLhFloz7NXMWDaqdX-zSn8rY-/s640/153934-153934-trump-europe.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div>
<o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
I often have the chance to teach about the creation of NATO,
in four different courses I teach (Western Civilization since 1815, U.S.
History since 1865, American Diplomatic History, and U.S. since 1945). Whenever
I do, I make a point of stressing what an incredible and important departure it
was in American foreign policy.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
When I tell students that the U.S. created and joined the
North Atlantic alliance in 1949, I always ask them when the U.S. last had
entered a formal alliance. They often guess World War II, and then World War I.
Students understandably assume that since the U.S. fought along side other
nations in both the First and Second World Wars, and we casually refer to
America’s “allies” in those wars, that there were treaties of alliance. But there
were none—in each case, the U.S. quite deliberately maintained its formal
separation from those it called its “allies.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
NATO was the first formal alliance for the U.S. in nearly
150 years. In 1800, the Adams administration negotiated an end to the French
alliance of 1778 that had helped the Americans win the Revolutionary War, and
the U.S. had not agreed to a single treaty of alliance since. When
revolutionary France went to war with Britain (America’s largest trading
partner) in the 1790s, the alliance seriously complicated not only American
foreign policy, but American domestic politics as well, and soured Americans on
the idea of any binding foreign commitments.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
After its war with Britain ended in 1815, the U.S.
assiduously avoided involvement in European political affairs. Its response to
conflicts in Europe was essentially “none of our business.” When both World
Wars broke out, the American response was to declare its neutrality. In 1949,
that changed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
American membership in NATO represented a fundamental shift
in American foreign policy. For nearly a century and a half, Americans insisted
on complete freedom of action in foreign policy. No binding commitments would
threaten to drag the U.S. into a foreign war. That determination was the single
largest factor in the Senate’s rejection of Woodrow Wilson’s vision for the
League of Nations after World War I. With NATO, the U.S. reversed course and
said that it would immediately go to war if one if its allies were attacked.
Why such a dramatic change?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The lesson of the two World Wars, in the minds of American
foreign policy makers, was that the U.S. could not avoid involvement in a major
European war. The only way to stay out of such a war, they decided, was to make
sure that one never broke out again. The only way to do that was deterrence
through a binding collective security agreement. Send the message to a
potential aggressor (the Soviet Union at the time) that American neutrality was
unequivocally a thing of the past: if World War III broke out, the (nuclear
armed) U.S. would be in it on Day One. That certainty would deter any potential
aggression and prevent another war.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
That certainty is what Donald Trump recklessly undermined
last week. NATO’s effectiveness depends on certainty, and he created uncertainty.
During the campaign, Trump suggested that America's commitment to honoring
Article 5 would become conditional. When asked if the U.S. under a Trump
administration would defend the Baltic states if attacked by Russia, he said
“If they fill their obligations to us.” That one small word, “if,” has the
potential to undermine the entire alliance. The whole point of NATO was to take
the “if” out of the calculation.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Last week, Trump had an opportunity as president to repair
the damage he had done as a candidate, and he passed on it. Administration
officials assured reporters beforehand that Trump would “publicly endorse
NATO’s mutual defense commitment.” But he did no such thing. He briefly
mentioned it in the context of NATO coming to America’s aid after 9/11, but
never stated his commitment to reciprocate. Instead, he harped once again on
the need for NATO nations to pay “their fair share.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There’s nothing inherently wrong with reminding members that
they have agreed to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Trump, by refusing to state his
commitment to Article 5 while making that demand, however, is turning NATO into
just another “deal.” He has said in the past that he thinks the U.S. is being
“taken advantage of” in NATO. In his transactional framing of the alliance,
European members are paying for American protection, and to get them to pay up,
he is implicitly threatening to refuse to honor America’s commitment. This is
his simple-minded idea of what constitutes “tough” leadership.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
As with so many other aspects of his disastrous presidency,
Trump here is misapplying his business approach to realms where it is not only
not applicable but downright destructive. NATO is not a “deal.” It is not a
protection racket. The American creation of NATO was meant to serve American
interests. It has done so for nearly 70 years. Undermining the alliance with
his childish and churlish attitude is self-defeating. It undeniably damages
American interests. The only open question is whether Trump is doing so out of
ignorance and foolishness, or for far more disturbing and sinister reasons.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-26587604577411255962016-12-18T20:46:00.000-05:002016-12-18T20:46:44.524-05:00The Election of 2016 and American Identity<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
[<i>This post was originally published on HNN: http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153856</i>]<br />
<br />
Not all presidential elections are created equal. Every election is a choice, of course, but the choices are not equally consequential. In some cases, the country seems largely set on what to do, and is debating little more than <i>how</i> to do it (Kennedy-Nixon in 1960). In others, there are more substantial questions of <i>what</i> we as a nation should do (Reagan-Carter in 1980). The most consequential ones, however, come down to the question of who we are as a people, how we <i>define</i> America as a state.<br />
<br />
I would argue that 2016 was the last of these.<br />
<br />
It was so because Donald Trump made it so.<br />
<br />
The 2008 campaign easily could have been one of those, with the Democrats choosing the first African-American major party nominee, with all that choice symbolized about what kind of country this is. While there were certainly moments in the campaign that threatened to veer in that direction, the Republican nominee, Sen. John McCain, stopped his campaign from exploiting that approach. When a woman at one of his town hall meetings said she thought Obama was “an Arab,” McCain stopped her: “No, ma'am. He's a decent family man [and] citizen that I just happen to have disagreements with on fundamental issues and that's what this campaign's all about. He's not [an Arab].” McCain was given the chance to make it a campaign that said I am one of “us” and he is one of “them,” and he insisted it should instead be a campaign about issues.<br />
<br />
Those two words—“No, ma’am”—made clear that McCain was determined not to take the low road. He would talk about what we should do, not who we are. He would say “no” to his supporters when they went down that other road. They are also the words Donald Trump never uttered in his campaign rallies, no matter what vile shouts his deliberate rabble-rousing provoked.<br />
<br />
Long before he became a candidate, Trump took the low road by becoming the most famous “birther” in America, again and again claiming that he was finding proof that Barack Obama was not born in the US, asserting that Obama was secretly some non-American “other.” What McCain disavowed, Trump took up—with glee. McCain thought there were things more important than winning, an attitude Trump clearly views with utter disdain. To Trump, decency is for losers.<br />
<br />
Trump’s birtherism was more than just a way to attract attention (though that may have been its chief attraction for him personally). It was in practice an attempt to repudiate the vision of America that Obama’s presidency represented, an America that defines itself by core beliefs that are available to <i>all</i> people, no matter their race, ethnicity, or religion—rather than by an immutable national type of person.<br />
<br />
It is no coincidence that Trump then literally began his campaign by demonizing Mexicans as criminals and rapists. His opening salvo against Mexicans set the tone that he never abandoned: these “other” people are different, they are not good, they do not belong here, they are not “us.” His attack on Judge Curiel demonstrated this perfectly. He said the judge could not be fair to him in the Trump University case because “he’s Mexican.” The fact that the judge was born and raised in the United States did not matter to Trump. “He’s Mexican. I’m building a wall.” For Trump, Curiel’s ethnic heritage was <b><i>who he was</i></b>. His birthplace, his profession, his devotion to the law and the Constitution were all irrelevant to Trump. The judge’s identity was his ethnicity, and it was Mexican, not American.<br />
<br />
He added to the ethnic dimension a religious one by calling for a ban on Muslims coming into the US. He did not call for a ban on extremists or terrorists. He called for a ban on everyone who adhered to a specific religion. He <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/" target="_blank">told CNN</a>: “I think Islam hates us.” Not some Muslims, not even some people from some countries that are predominantly Muslim. “Islam hates us,” he said—ignoring the many American Muslims who <b><i>are</i></b> “us.” What that lays bare is that for Trump, Muslims are not “us.” They may be <i>here</i>, but they don’t really <i>belong</i> here, because they are not really of “us.”<br />
<br />
His positions and policies (and the rhetoric he used to promote them) made it clear that his slogan—“Make America Great Again”—meant that the US should be defined in racial, ethnic, and religious terms: as a predominantly white, Christian country again. His unabashed bigotry throughout his campaign challenged every American to decide: is this who we are? Is America defined by racial, ethnic, and religious traits or is it not?<br />
<br />
As I see it, there have long been two competing visions of what the United States is: a country based on an idea or a nation like all the others.<br />
<br />
The first argues that the United States is not any particular ethnicity, language, culture, or religion—some of the traits that usually comprise a “nation.” Instead, the United States is fundamentally an idea, one whose basic tenets were argued in the Declaration of Independence and given practical application in the Constitution. At its core, America is the embodiment of the liberalism that emerged from the Enlightenment, which took as a self-evident truth that all people are equal, that all people are fundamentally the same, no matter where they live. They all have basic rights as humans, rights that no government can grant or deny, but only respect or violate. Because this fundamental liberal idea erased the traditional lines that divided people based on race, ethnicity, or religion, it was a “universalist” (or, to use a common term of derision among Trump supporters, “globalist”) concept. It was open to everyone, everywhere. By extension, the American idea (and America itself) was open to everyone, everywhere.<br />
<br />
Unlike the situation in other “nations,” since America was an idea, one could become an American by learning about and devoting oneself to that idea. This fact is embodied today in the citizenship test given to those wishing to become Americans: it is a civics test, with questions about American history and government. The final step is taking an oath of allegiance, in which one pledges to support and defend not the “homeland” but the Constitution. The oath is not to territory or blood, but to <i>what we believe and how we do things</i>: to become an American means to believe in certain ideas and commit to living by them.<br />
<br />
The other concept of the state is older and more traditional. The United States is a territory, a piece of land. It is also a particular group of people with unique, identifiable national traits that set them apart from others. Trump’s constant refrain about “the wall” perfectly captures this sense of territory in concrete terms. He says that the borders are absolutely essential to defining the nation: “A nation without borders is not a nation at all.” After the Orlando shooting, Trump tied the idea of the nation explicitly to immigration. Eliding the fact that the killer himself was born in the US, he noted that his parents were immigrants and said: “If we don't get tough and if we don't get smart, and fast, we're not going to have our country anymore. There will be nothing, absolutely nothing left.” Immigrants, he suggested, will destroy the country.<br />
<br />
This is why the border must be, in his words, “strong” or “secure.” Keeping “our” country means keeping the wrong people out. Otherwise there will be “people who don’t belong here.” While in theory this could be merely about a given immigrant’s legal status, Trump’s rhetoric and proposals give the lie to that—the Orlando killer’s parents were not “illegal” after all, but they were Afghans and Muslims. The wall won’t be on the border with Canada, either. He singles out Mexicans and Muslims, which has the effect of defining who exactly the people who do “belong here” are—those who are white and Christian. Trump’s nonsensical promise that “we are going to start saying ‘Merry Christmas’ again” signals that he will make America Christian again. He <a href="http://www.cnsnews.com/blog/michael-w-chapman/trump-we-are-going-start-saying-merry-christmas-again-thats-way-it-should-be" target="_blank">told Tony Perkins</a>: “I see more and more, especially, in particular, Christianity, Christians, their power is being taken away.” The passive voice masks who precisely is doing the taking away, but it is not hard to imagine who he means: it must be non-Christians, maybe secularists, maybe Muslims. Either way, “them,” and not “us.” (It is also noteworthy that he says Christians had “power”—which suggests a previous supremacy that’s been lost.)<br />
<br />
By striking these themes, Trump has appealed to this traditional, more tribal concept of what America is, or should be: not an idea based on universal principles, but a state rooted in a particular place and with a specific, dominant identity comprised of racial, ethnic, and religious traits that should never change.<br />
<br />
The irony is that in doing so, Trump is effectively saying the United States is not really distinctive, at least not in the way it usually thinks of itself. It is a nation like all other nations. Trump has, in fact, explicitly <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/donald-trump-american-exceptionalism" target="_blank">rejected American exceptionalism</a>: “I don't think it's a very nice term. We're exceptional; you're not…. I don't want to say, ‘We're exceptional. We're more exceptional.’ Because essentially we're saying we're more outstanding than you.” While he couched this is business terms, claiming that since the US was being bested in trade it could not claim to be better, he was openly and consciously rejecting a basic tenet of Republican orthodoxy since at least Ronald Reagan. Coming from the standard bearer of the 2016 Republican Party, which has beat the “American exceptionalism” drum relentlessly (especially in the Obama years), that is rather stunning—but it also makes sense from another perspective.<br />
<br />
Jelani Cobb <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/donald-trump-and-the-death-of-american-exceptionalism" target="_blank">wrote recently</a> in the <i>New Yorker</i> that Trump’s political rise represents the “death of American exceptionalism.” He states: “The United States’ claim to moral primacy in the world, the idea of American exceptionalism, rests upon the argument that this is a nation set apart.” By emulating the “anti-immigrant, authoritarian, and nationalist movements we’ve witnessed in Germany, the U.K., Turkey, and France,” Cobb argues, Trump forfeits that American “claim to moral superiority.”<br />
<br />
I agree with Cobb, but I think it goes even deeper than he suggests: it is a rejection of the idea-based definition of what America is and a reversion to an older, European one. American exceptionalism not only encompassed a moral claim, not only set the United States apart from other nations. It even—or maybe especially—set the US apart from those places from which most of its founding generation fled: the states of Europe. Here in America, the thinking went, the people will create something new and different, based on first principles and following the dictates of reason, unrestrained by tradition, culture, religion—by anything but the best ideas. In Thomas Paine’s famous words, “we have it in our power to begin the world over again.” The United States would show the world what could be accomplished when free people creating a new state had the chance to write on John Locke’s <i>tabula rosa</i>. (It should go without saying that this was never literally true, but rather an ideal to which people aspired.)<br />
<br />
In doing so, Americans were effectively saying: “We are not our European ancestors. We are different. They are tribal, we are not.” For most of the 19th century and well into the 20th, American isolationism was based on the foundational idea that the US, despite its ancestry, was decidedly not European. It would not be ruled by Europe and it would not be drawn into Europe’s tribal squabbles. The US was different—and better. It may have been borne of Europe, but it would supersede it and show it a better way.<br />
<br />
More often than not in recent decades, it has been American conservatives who have shown disdain for Europe, sneering at the idea that the US should look to Europe for ideas or leadership of any kind: in law, in public policy, in diplomacy. But scratch the surface and what we see is not contempt for Europe per se but for liberalism as it has developed in Europe since the end of World War II. As right-wing, anti-liberal movements have grown in Europe, so has American conservatism’s appreciation for what Europe has to teach Americans.<br />
<br />
As Cobb points out, what is striking about Trump is how much his program resembles that of right-wing extremists in European states who reject that better way America sought to offer in favor of the old European way. Trump’s program is not uniquely American. Arguably, it is following an ancient pattern set in Europe that is rearing its ugly head again in the 21st century. (Trump himself said his election would be “Brexit times 10”—bigger, but not original.) Trump is following more than he is leading, copying a formula that has had some success elsewhere, one that is far from uniquely American. It is, if anything, uniquely European—in the worst sense.<br />
<br />
Recently the <i>New York Times</i> had <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/americas/alt-right-vladimir-putin.html?_r=0" target="_blank">an article on how the far-right European movements have adopted Vladimir Putin as their hero</a>, for his defense of “traditional values.” It quotes an American white Christian nationalist praising Putin: “I see President Putin as the leader of the free world.” (His definition of “free” must be markedly different from the one that has dominated in American political culture, but the framing is telling. Theirs is not the freedom of the Enlightenment, but rather freedom from the threat of the non-western or non-traditional “other.”)<br />
<br />
Most American pundits, still caught in a cold-war paradigm, marveled at Trump’s embrace of Putin, and could not understand how it failed to discredit him as it seemingly should have (even this past weekend’s stories on the CIA’s conclusion that Russia sought to help Trump in the election has yet to leave a mark on him). Those critics failed to see that a new paradigm has completely eclipsed that of the cold war. They missed the fact that, despite his KGB pedigree, Putin has transformed himself into “a symbol of strength, racial purity and traditional Christian values in a world under threat from Islam, immigrants and rootless cosmopolitan elites.” In the new paradigm, these are the new enemies, the real enemies of the 21st century. Communists have been vanquished. Islamists, immigrants, globalists, “others” of all kinds, have taken their place. The cold war was a battle of ideologies; this is a battle of identities.<br />
<br />
If this take is correct, the combination of Trump’s willingness to jettison American exceptionalism and his embrace of Putinism as “real” leadership portends a significant transformation of what it means to be an American. Rather than a country built on ideas and principles, which defines itself by its devotion to those principles, Trump’s America is simply one (albeit the most powerful) of the many western tribes beating back the “uncivilized” hordes that threaten to undermine the white, Christian traditional identity of the west. In such a world, embracing Putin as a partner makes sense—even if he does have journalists and other political enemies murdered or imprisoned. Embracing anti-liberal autocrats and dictators in order to destroy ISIS becomes not a necessary evil, but a positive good, a desirable state of affairs, a restoration of an ancient European unity against the infidel.<br />
<br />
Implicit in this view is a rejection of Enlightenment liberalism. Once you jettison the commitment to an idea and embrace a politics based on racial, ethnic, and religious identity, showing a reckless disregard for democratic norms and processes (as Trump reflexively does) is natural, since those things have no inherent value. <i>How we do things</i> does not matter—all that matters is <i>who we are </i>and what we must do to protect that essential identity. Since American identity is not defined by principles of any kind, it is not important to have principles of any kind. The only standard by which to judge right and wrong is success in defending the homeland from the “other.” So Trump can blithely pledge to restore “waterboarding and a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding” with no qualms whatsoever. After all, he asserts, “torture works.”<br />
<br />
Trump has made clear repeatedly that that is his only standard: what works. When <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-willing-to-keep-parts-of-health-law-1478895339" target="_blank">asked by the </a><i><a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-willing-to-keep-parts-of-health-law-1478895339" target="_blank">Wall Street Journal</a> </i>after the election whether he had gone too far with his rhetoric during the campaign, he said flatly: “No. I won.” His worldview is entirely instrumental: what works is right, what fails is wrong. Nothing could be more fundamentally opposed to a commitment to liberal process, which values process as a good in itself, as the glue that holds together people with different views and beliefs.<br />
<br />
When Marxists, following the logic of economic determinism, claimed that class created identity, fascists countered with racial determinism: the blood determined identity. What has always set liberalism apart from these extremist ideologies is the belief that people create their own identities. As rational beings, we can create who we are by deciding what we believe. We are not merely the products of race, or ethnicity, or class. We are who we choose to be.<br />
<br />
What made this election so consequential is that it posed the question of who Americans are as a people as clearly as it has been since 1860. Hillary Clinton’s campaign recognized this with its slogan: “Stronger Together.” Trump’s strategy was to encourage white Christian nationalism, and Clinton’s was to say we cannot go back to some tribal concept of American identity. What has disturbed so many of us about Trump’s elevation to the presidency is not simply that our candidate didn’t win. It is that the choice that 46.2% of the voters made is so antithetical to our vision of what America can and should be. It threatens a reversion to a more primitive tribalism that has proved so horrifically destructive in the past. We know the history. We know the danger. That is why this was no normal election and this will be no normal presidency. This country is about to be tested as it has not been since the 1860s, and the outcome is not at all clear.<br />
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-39479530914869247492016-03-30T16:50:00.001-04:002016-03-30T16:50:35.319-04:00Orrin Hatch's Embarrassing New York Times Op-ed<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<i>This piece was originally published on <a href="http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153750" target="_blank">History News Network</a></i><br />
<br />
Senator Orrin Hatch took to the <i><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/opinion/let-voters-decide-the-courts-future.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0" target="_blank">New York Times op-ed page</a></i> to try to make the case for the Senate refusing to take up President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee. <br />
<br />
It didn’t go well.<br />
<br />
He starts by praising the late Antonin Scalia, implying that the rules should be different when replacing one of the “greatest jurists in our nation’s history.” The obvious reply is that it does not matter who the president is replacing. All openings on the Court are created equal. <br />
<br />
Hatch then asserts that Obama has “contempt” for Scalia’s judicial philosophy. That may or may not be true, but in any case, it is irrelevant. When the electorate once again decisively elected Obama as president in 2012, it did not include an asterisk that said he could only replace justices with whom he agreed.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR6E3yfX-290FFnKMyoP-JAEcB2Zf37Zez6a2-_xmFj9kS6ltPBLGH3YKeku4hi5T8KUmS0hpoogvjYfNEwXhJpSLQnaTcd233isWuAoVHp1Ij-JCJ2X9ayh9bnrfXnwhYxFJ2fmKTA7D5/s1600/Orrin_Hatch_official_photo_smaller.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR6E3yfX-290FFnKMyoP-JAEcB2Zf37Zez6a2-_xmFj9kS6ltPBLGH3YKeku4hi5T8KUmS0hpoogvjYfNEwXhJpSLQnaTcd233isWuAoVHp1Ij-JCJ2X9ayh9bnrfXnwhYxFJ2fmKTA7D5/s320/Orrin_Hatch_official_photo_smaller.jpg" width="254" /></a></div>
<br />
His next point is that when a senator, Obama opposed two of President Bush’s nominees. Again, this is irrelevant. No one is claiming that Hatch or any other Republican has to <i>support</i> Obama’s nominee—just that Judge Garland deserves a hearing and a vote. Republicans now are as free as Obama was then to oppose the confirmation of the nominee.<br />
<br />
Hatch then moves on to even more absurdly irrelevant points, such as his assertion that Obama has “consistently exceeded the scope of his legitimate constitutional authority.” Putting aside how questionable that point is, what Hatch seems to be suggesting is that if senators think such a thing about a president, the president loses the right to exercise legitimate constitutional powers. The Constitution provides Congress with a remedy for a president who exceeds the scope of legitimate constitutional authority: impeachment. The simple fact that a Republican House has not taken up impeachment reveals Hatch’s point for the nonsense it is. <br />
<br />
He then notes that the American people have chosen a Democratic president and Republican Senate. Fair enough. But that in no way leads to Hatch’s conclusion that the Senate can therefore ignore the nomination. What that “split decision” suggests is that the Democratic president should nominate a person who is not his political ideal, but a compromise candidate more acceptable to that Republican Senate. By choosing Merrick Garland, that is precisely what Obama has done. He is respecting the idea of checks and balances, both institutionally and politically. He did not chose someone who was a darling of the Democratic left, but someone who has (in the past) been repeatedly praised by Republicans, including Hatch himself. By refusing to even consider the nominee of the elected president, it is Hatch and the Senate Republicans who are not respecting the “split decision” of the American people, not the president. They are saying that the smaller subset of the American public that elected those Senate Republicans can simply ignore the decision of the entire national electorate in the last presidential election. <br />
<br />
For an historian, perhaps the most offensive point Hatch makes is this: “Throughout its history, the Senate has never confirmed a nominee to fill a Supreme Court vacancy that occurred this late in a term-limited president’s time in office.” As a history teacher, I am used to the instinct unprepared undergraduates have to bolster a poor argument with the “throughout history” trick. I expect better of United States Senators. <br />
<br />
Hatch shows his contempt for his readers with this tortured construction. To make his “throughout its history” line work, Hatch needs to make that history awfully short. He does that with the phrase “term-limited.” The 22nd Amendment, which imposes term limits on presidents, has only been in effect for 65 years. So this particular “throughout its history” means for 65 years—less than Hatch’s own life span.<br />
<br />
As I pointed out in my <a href="http://byrnesms.blogspot.com/2016/02/ted-cruzs-phony-supreme-court-tradition.html" target="_blank">previous piece on this subject</a>, there has only been one other vacancy during that period that was “this late” in a president’s term: LBJ’s nomination of Abe Fortas in 1968. Yes, Fortas was not confirmed as Chief Justice. That nomination received a hearing, however, and a vote. It was not met with this disingenuous nonsense that “we never do this.” And as Hatch well knows, 1968 was one of the most contentious elections years in American history. Somehow, the Senate still did its job.<br />
<br />
That leads to the next part of Hatch’s “kitchen sink” piece. He blames the “toxic presidential election” for Republican irresponsibility on this nomination. Anyone paying any attention knows that the current toxicity is almost entirely on his party’s side. Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders have mostly conducted their primary contest on a high, substantive level. Hatch calls this the “nastiest election year in recent memory.” He neglects to mention that the nastiness is almost entirely on the Republican side. By some inexplicable logic, the fact that the Republican Party is wallowing in the political gutter means that the Democratic president’s nominee for the Supreme Court should not be treated like any other nominee.<br />
<br />
Lastly, Hatch notes: “I have witnessed firsthand the deterioration of the confirmation process. Neither party has clean hands on this front.” That is true. It is also true that what Hatch proposes as the responsible course of action is in fact an extraordinary escalation of the politicization of the nomination process far beyond what either party has done in the past. It shows contempt for the 2012 electorate that elected Barack Obama. It shows contempt for the president personally. It shows contempt for American history.<br />
<br />
Nothing in Hatch’s piece changes any of that.<br />
<br />
If Hatch and his fellow Republicans want to vote against Judge Garland, they have every right to do so. But they should stop being cowards. They should make a substantive argument against him, vote against him, and accept the political consequences of that vote. They should stop pretending that this reckless path they have chosen is anything but a desperate attempt to hold onto a Supreme Court majority.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-12900075153444461972016-03-06T16:03:00.000-05:002016-03-06T16:03:53.447-05:00BBC 5 Radio Interview on Ted Cruz and his Phony Supreme Court "Tradition"<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
On February 25, BBC 5 Radio program "Up All Night" with Rhod Sharp interviewed me about the Supreme Court vacancy and the post I wrote about Ted Cruz. The audio file is below.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.blogger.com/video.g?token=AD6v5dygwlRWavsd9lkHEWpGeaQ2R6wmz2XyeK8Qmu6xflCJPDkz-cKjLwUx1ZZqq2moiflrfN-yzm9DavBJ0fWqIQ' class='b-hbp-video b-uploaded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-58592757463140427002016-02-16T15:10:00.000-05:002016-02-16T15:10:55.206-05:00Ted Cruz's Phony Supreme Court "Tradition"<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
[This post originally appeared on <a href="http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153732" target="_blank">History News Network</a>]</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
“It has been 80 years since a Supreme Court vacancy was nominated and confirmed in an election year. There is a long tradition that you don't do this in an election year."—Senator Ted Cruz<span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px;"> </span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
If he honestly believes it is not legitimate to nominate and confirm a justice in an election year, Ted Cruz must <i>hate</i> the appointment of Chief Justice John Marshall. John Adams nominated him in January 1801, after he lost his re-election bid to Thomas Jefferson in the election of 1800. Adams was a lame duck in the truest sense of the term—he was serving out the remainder of his term after being repudiated by the voters. Yet he did not hesitate to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court, and Marshall was confirmed by a lame duck Senate.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYqOK5TgL2m_ldXCNZcZoMkRqfMkcZF-3yCLiL3Hb1_GmzEw98o8LBOVfhkS92n4oIRQ_tJwk6XN6S1KjwyhlSEtP7R1-idanZfOOxcitDaFa6zI8m3IT8DqYxxER5ZAvJT6tJOin4YHoO/s1600/Cruz2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYqOK5TgL2m_ldXCNZcZoMkRqfMkcZF-3yCLiL3Hb1_GmzEw98o8LBOVfhkS92n4oIRQ_tJwk6XN6S1KjwyhlSEtP7R1-idanZfOOxcitDaFa6zI8m3IT8DqYxxER5ZAvJT6tJOin4YHoO/s320/Cruz2.jpg" width="292" /></a>Perhaps the most striking irony of Cruz’s position (and increasingly the position of the entire Republican Party) is that this absurd debate is taking place over the replacement of Antonin Scalia. If there is one thing Scalia was known for, it is his originalist interpretation of the Constitution: it means what the founding generation said it meant. So is seems appropriate to ask: what did the Founders actually do in such circumstances?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
In the final year of his presidency, George Washington had two nominations to the Supreme Court approved by the Senate. It was an election year and he was not running for reelection. It doesn’t get more "original intent" than that. Adams could easily have left the Supreme Court vacancy for Jefferson—who had already been elected, after all, and would take office in a matter of weeks—and didn’t. That seems as clear as it could be. The founders saw no impediment to a president in the final year--or even in the final weeks--of the presidency successfully appointing new justices to the Supreme Court.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
What about Cruz's contention about the last 80 years? Even that does not hold up.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
The facts are pretty simple. In the last 80 years there has only been one instance in which a president was in a position to nominate a justice in an election year and did not have the nominee confirmed. In 1968, LBJ’s nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice to succeed Earl Warren (and of Homer Thornberry to take the seat held by Fortas) was blocked in the Senate, but not because of some alleged “tradition.” Certainly there were Senators who wanted the next president to name a new justice. But the opposition to Fortas had everything to do with the specific nominee and specific objections to him (particularly charges of cronyism and inappropriate financial dealings). To the best of my knowledge, no one cited Cruz’s “tradition” to say it was not appropriate for Johnson to nominate someone, or that it would have been inappropriate to confirm <i>anyone</i>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
A second instance took place 28 years earlier. In 1940, FDR nominated Frank Murphy in January of that election year and he was confirmed that same month. There was no “tradition” blocking that election-year appointment. (This also shows that Cruz got the math wrong—this happened 76 years ago, not 80.) [<i>Note: The morning after this post first appeared, Orrin Hatch spoke on NPR and amended the claim to no "term-limited" president had had a nominee confirmed in an election year--evidently an attempt to exempt FDR's confirmed nominee from the "tradition."</i>]</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
So, there were two instances similar to the current situation in the last 80 years. In one case the nomination was rejected and in the other it wasn’t. To Ted Cruz, this constitutes “a long tradition that you don't do this.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
Ted Cruz’s invention of this alleged "tradition" that we don’t nominate and confirm Supreme Court justices in an election year would be laughable if so many supposedly responsible political leaders were not taking it seriously.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
It is absurd on the face of it. If the Republicans in the Senate want to block any nominee Barack Obama sends them, they have the votes to do it. But they should stop hiding behind the obvious fiction that doing so is part of some “tradition.” It would be nothing but the raw, cynical use of their political power. This suggestion that Obama should not even nominate someone (both John Kasich and Marco Rubio said so in Saturday’s debate), or if he does, that the nominee should be rejected out of hand simply because of the timing (as the Senate Majority Leader and many Republican Senators are now saying), is simply silly. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
True conservatives don’t invent traditions. They work to protect existing ones. Our true tradition is that the president nominates and the Senate votes, regardless of when the vacancy occurs. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
The speed with which Cruz jumped to make this claim and with which so many others have fallen in line, speaks to the nihilistic radicalism that has infected today's Republican Party. Any position can be taken if it produces the correct result. Facts can be denied, “traditions” can be invented. The only value taken seriously is “does it work to our advantage?”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 20px; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
This tactic may well work politically. It has already had the effect of framing the debate as “Should Obama nominate someone?” That is truly extraordinary. The actual question should be “Should the Senate confirm Obama’s nominee?” That’s a legitimate debate, but it would put the focus on the nominee and that person’s qualifications. By hiding behind this phony “tradition,” Republicans are trying to avoid having to show that a given nominee should be rejected on the merits. In short, they don’t want to take responsibility for rejecting someone who—in all likelihood—will be eminently qualified for the job. That’s not statesmanship. It’s cowardice.</div>
</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-15207609218325665932015-12-16T14:37:00.001-05:002015-12-16T14:37:05.964-05:00A Brief History of American Attitudes Toward Refugees<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
[<i>Back in September, in response to efforts opposing the resettlement of Syrian refugees in South Carolina, my colleague Dr. Byron McCane organized a group of Wofford College faculty to present a panel on the subject of refugees. My colleagues Dr. Laura Barbas-Rhoden (Modern Languages), Dr. Phil Dorroll (Religion), Dr. Kim Rostan (English) and I all participated. My job was to give a brief overview of refugees in American history in the September 24 event at Wofford.</i><br />
<i> On Nov. 11, we reprised the panel at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, with the welcome additions of USC colleagues Dr. Breanne Grace (College of Social Work) and Dr. Rajeev Bais (Clinical Internal Medicine).</i><br />
<i> Due to recent events, the refugee situation has unfortunately become a political issue in the presidential race, with candidates like Ted Cruz and Jeb Bush asserting that only Christian refugees should be admitted into the United States, and Donald Trump calling for a ban on all Muslims entering the United States. Below is an adapted version of my presentations at Wofford and USC. This previously appeared as a series of posts on History News Network.</i>]<br />
<br />
<br />
From the earliest days of the republic, the American attitude toward those fleeing conflicts and hardship abroad has been marked by an ambivalence and tension between two contradictory reactions.<br />
<br />
On the one hand, Americans want to see themselves as a people who welcome refugees. In the 1790s, the American scientist David Rittenhouse said the United States was “an asylum to the good, to the persecuted, and to the oppressed of other climes.” The prominent historian Gordon Wood writes: “By the early 1790s Americans were not surprised that their country was in fact attracting refugees from the tyrannies of the Old World. The enlightened everywhere had come to recognize the United States as the special asylum for liberty.”<br />
<br />
On the other hand, Americans have also feared that such people might represent a danger to the United States: religious, political, economic, cultural--or all of the above.<br />
<br />
When I say from the earliest days, I mean just that. The decade of the 1790s saw nearly 100,000 immigrants come into the United States—at a time when the population of the country was about 4 million people. Probably at least 15-20,000 of them were political refugees, fleeing revolutionary violence and political oppression.<br />
<br />
The first refugee crisis in United States history came during the first term of George Washington, in 1792. The revolution in Santo Domingo led to thousands of refugees fleeing the island, most of whom came to Richmond, Virginia. One historian’s estimate of perhaps 10,000 is probably too high, but there are records indicating the existence of at least 2,000 such refugees in the US by 1794. We know this because Congress voted a specific appropriation of $15,000 for the relief of the refugees (out of $6.3 million budget that year). As the historian of this incident concluded: “For the first time in its existence as an independent state, the United States met the refugee problem in its most tragic form, and met it with … generosity and human sympathy.”<br />
<br />
Many thousands of other refugees also fled to the United States in the 1790s, mostly from the more famous revolution in France. They were, as one historian put it, of all political stripes: “Royalists, Republicans, Catholics, Masons, courtiers, artisans, priests and philosophers.” These political refugees started their own explicitly political newspapers and book presses. They brought their passions with them, and competing groups sometimes engaged in street violence against each other.<br />
<br />
In 1795, the pro-British Jay’s Treaty damaged American relations with revolutionary France and threatened to result in outright war. If war came, the Federalists feared that the French would use “native collaborators to create revolutionary puppet republics” and “French emigres and Jacobinical sympathizers in the country [might] become collaborators.”<br />
<br />
Suddenly, asylum seekers were seen as the threat within. In 1798, Federalist Rep. Harrison Gray of Massachusetts, said: “Do we not know that the French nation have organized bands of aliens as well as their own citizens, in other countries, to bring about their nefarious purposes? By these means they have overrun all the republics in the world but our own … And may we not expect the same means to be employed against this country?” Another Federalist said that the new immigrants were “the grand cause of all our present difficulties” and plainly stated: “let us no longer pray that America become an asylum to all nations.”<br />
<br />
As a result of this growing fear, Congress changed the law. The first Naturalization Law in 1790 had required only two years residency in the US before one could become a citizen. That was extended to five years residency in 1795, and then in 1798, Congress raised it to 14 years. All immigrants were required to register with the government within 48 hours of arrival, and the law forbade all aliens who were citizens or subjects of a nation with which the US was at war from becoming American citizens.<br />
<br />
The crackdown on immigrants and refugees was inextricably wrapped up in domestic politics. The Alien Act, passed by a Federalist Congress and signed by a Federalist president, was a reaction to their fear that the newcomers were overwhelmingly supporters of Thomas Jefferson’s Republican party. Refugees from revolutionary France were joined by hundreds, perhaps thousands, fleeing political oppression in Ireland. Their historian Michael Durey concludes: “the radicals’ experiences after emigration were too varied and problematic to allow us to any longer assume uncritically that America was a welcoming asylum for them all. For many it was Bedlam.”<br />
<br />
The Alien Act was allowed to expire, and the anti-French fever broke. But the tendency to both welcome and fear refugees would continue in the 19th century, long after the specific fear of the French dissipated.<br />
<br />
Fifty years after the Alien Act, revolution in Europe again produced a similar American reaction to the influx of refugees. The revolutions of 1848, starting in Paris and spreading through much of Europe, also produced a large number of political refugees to the United States, especially Germans who were known in the U.S. as the “Forty-eighters.”<br />
<br />
The American government generally welcomed the revolutions, seeing them as democratic in character, and thus consistent with American values. In fact, the United States “was the only major government which saw fit to send greetings to the Parliament at Frankfurt.” President James K. Polk stated: “The great principles of … the Declaration of Independence seem now to be in the course of rapid development throughout the world.”<br />
<br />
But as students of the Revolutions of 1848 well know, those revolutions were more complex than that, and so were the refugees who fled to America. According to their historian, the “typical Forty-eighter was a freethinker, if not an atheist. They believed in universal suffrage, abolition of the Sunday laws, taxation of church property, establishment of the eight hour day, and government ownership of the railroads.”<br />
<br />
Some Americans thus denounced them as “socialists, rationalists, atheists and desecrators of the Sabbath.” Southerners in particular feared their influence because the Forty-eighters were thought to favor abolitionism. Some Forty-eighters were, in fact, socialists. One, Ernst Schmidt, would later run for mayor of Chicago in 1859 on a socialist ticket, while others formed their own utopian socialist communities in the United States.<br />
<br />
Some of the Forty-eighters were also liberal Catholics, and of course at the same time thousands upon thousands of Irish Catholics were arriving in the United States as economic refugees of the famine in Ireland. This combination gave rise to an explicitly nativist movement that found political expression in the American Party, more commonly known as the “Know-Nothings.”<br />
<br />
The Know-Nothings never actually succeeded in changing American law regarding refuges and immigrants, but in their oath, members pledged to never vote for any man for any office who was not born in the United States. They called for “War to the hilt on political Romanism” and “Hostility to all Papal influences when brought to bear against the Republic.” They effectively argued that Catholicism was not so much a religion deserving First Amendment protection as a dangerous political movement contrary to democracy. (This is reminiscent of Dr. Ben Carson’s recent statement that Islam is “inconsistent with the values and principles of America.”)<br />
<br />
The Know-Nothings saw the Irish and Germans as a religious/political threat, bringing “Popery” to the United States and thus undermining American principles. The Know-Nothings wanted to deny the newcomers the right to vote—they called for increasing the required number of years of residency from 5 to 21 before an immigrant could vote. (I cannot help but wonder how the Know-Nothings of the 1850s would have reacted to the sight back in September of the Pope, standing where the President stands when giving the State of the Union, addressing the United States Congress, while the Catholic Speaker of the House and Catholic Vice-President sat behind him.)<br />
<br />
Despite these political reactions in the mid-19th century, what seems note-worthy in retrospect is that there was no legislative attempt to actually prevent any people from coming into the United States prior to 1882. When it happened, it was deliberately, openly discriminatory. That year, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act. This was an explicitly racial law, a response to the popular backlash against the large number of Chinese in the west, which barred immigration by the Chinese.<br />
<br />
Most American are familiar with the fact that many Chinese came to work on the transcontinental railroad, but what is often forgotten is that many were also refugees from the one of the bloodiest periods of Chinese history, the era of the Taiping Rebellion—in the 30 years before the Chinese Exclusion Act, an estimated 20-30 million Chinese died in a major civil war and several different rebellions. Over 1.5 million fled China, and historians estimate that 250,000 of them came to the United States. (Oregon alone had about 100,000 Chinese in 1890.) The Exclusion Act remained law for 60 years, until it was finally repealed during World War II, when China was an American ally in the war against Japan.<br />
<br />
Despite the Chinese Exclusion Act, for most of the people of the world, the United States remained a place of asylum. The great turning point was World War I. The previous two decades had seen millions of immigrants, many from southern and eastern Europe, arrive on American shores, leading to increasing calls for limitations.<br />
<br />
Once America entered the World War in 1917, the fear that lingering attachments of these relative newcomers to their mother countries might create conflicting loyalties in wartime led to the propaganda theme “100% Americanism.” In addition to the well-known reactions against German-Americans, any so-called “hyphenated American” now became suspect. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 added the fear of radical politics to the mix—this, despite the fact that many of those seeking asylum in the United States because of the revolutions in Russia were fleeing the Bolsheviks, not people who shared their views. <br />
<br />
The postwar period saw immigrants—particularly those suspected of radical politics—subjected to heightened levels of scrutiny and even deportation. The drive to put restrictions on eventually led to legislation: first the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, and then a permanent Immigration Act in 1924.<br />
<br />
As a result of decades of growing nativist sentiment, the United States for the first time in its history imposed quota limits on the number of people allowed to come into the country: 165,000 maximum per year, with a quota that was based on the number of people from that country in the 1890 census. No specific provision was made in the legislation for refugees. Supporters of the legislation made it clear that the goal of maintain an “Anglo-Saxon” nation was more important that being an “asylum for the oppressed.”<br />
<br />
Senator Ellison DuRant Smith of South Carolina said:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Thank God we have in America perhaps the largest percentage of any country in the world of the pure, unadulterated Anglo-Saxon stock; certainly the greatest of any nation in the Nordic breed. It is for the preservation of that splendid stock that has characterized us that I would make this not an asylum for the oppressed of all countries, but a country to assimilate and perfect that splendid type of manhood that has made America the foremost Nation.</blockquote>
After 140 years of effectively welcoming all those who wished to come, the United States shut the door.<br />
<br />
It is probably no coincidence that this change corresponds roughly with the emergence of the nation as a great power on the world stage. While outsiders had long been viewed suspiciously—especially those with different religious or political views—now such people were perceived as not just a potential internal threat, but as what we would now call a “national security threat.”<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
There was no need for an American policy toward refugees prior to the 1920s, since there were so few restrictions on entering the United States. The immigration restriction legislation, however, changed that. It required that no more than two percent “of the number of foreign-born individuals of such nationality resident in continental United States as determined by the United States Census of 1890” be allowed into the United States in any year. By setting strict numerical quotas based on the country of origin, the law left no flexibility depending on the circumstances in that country, and thus no ability to adjust to a refugee problem.<br />
<br />
Thus the Immigration Act of 1924 set the stage for two disgraceful incidents in America’s history of dealing with refugees. Despite the rising persecution of German Jews in the late 1930s, all German immigration to the United States was subject to the existing yearly quota (due to the formula noted above, Germany actually had by far the highest quota in the world, over 50,000). In early 1939, in the aftermath of Krystallnacht in November 1938, Sen. Robert Wagner of New York proposed to Congress a Refugee Act that would allow 20,000 German children into the United States, over and above the established yearly national quota.<br />
<br />
Wagner’s intent was that those children would be German Jews, but fearing that anti-Semitism would doom the bill, he did not specify that in the legislation. Opponents argued that, whatever its merits might be, the bill would undermine the quota system. They also made an economic argument. One said in testimony to Congress: “These children, if admitted, will presumably grow up and as youths will become competitors with American citizens for American jobs.” Opponents killed the bill in Congress, and no refugee children came to the United States. There is no way to know how many children might have able to enter the United States, but it seems likely that some who might have been saved later died in the Holocaust.<br />
<br />
In another case that has become much more well known in recent weeks, we know exactly how many could have been saved had they been admitted into the United States. In the midst of the Refugee Bill debate, the ocean liner St. Louis sailed from Hamburg for Cuba with over 900 German Jews fleeing the Nazi regime. Opposition arose in Cuba to letting them into that country, with anti-immigrant groups claiming that the passengers were Communists and thus should not be admitted. Only 22 of the Jewish passengers were allowed into Cuba. 743 were awaiting visas to enter the United States but had not received them. They cabled the State Department and the White House from the ship asking to be allowed into the United States. But at that time 83% of Americans opposed any relaxation of the immigration laws, and since the German quota for the year had already been filled, they were denied entry. The passengers returned to Europe. The British, Dutch, Belgians and French took in the refugees. But due to the German occupation during the war of all of those countries save Britain, some 254 of them died in the Holocaust. The United States government, knowing full well that Germany was persecuting its Jews, refused to alter its immigration policy to save refugees and 254 lives that could have been saved were lost.<br />
<br />
World War II, of course, created an unprecedentedly large refugee problem. In 1945, President Truman did what FDR never did: he issued an executive order allowing in 40,000 refugees above the quotas. In 1946, he proposed to Congress the Displaced Persons Act, which produced the same kind of response as Wagner’s Refugee Act did in 1939—opponents charged (despite the nearly full employment postwar economy) that they would take jobs from returning veterans. Some argued that the bill would allow Communists into the United States. Concerns that large numbers of Jews (who were often equated with Communism) would be admitted led supporters of the legislation to stress that most of those admitted would be Christians. This time opponents did not defeat the bill. It passed. They did, however, cut the number admitted into the US in half, from 400,000 to 200,000.<br />
<br />
Throughout most of the cold war, U.S. policy toward refugees was largely driven by cold war foreign policy, and on a case-by-case basis. As a rule, those fleeing communism were welcomed. The United States admitted refugees of the Hungarian revolution against the Soviet-backed regime in 1956, for example. Under President Dwight Eisenhower, the United States conducted “Operation Safe Haven” for Hungarian refugees. Eisenhower said: "It is heartening to witness the speed with which free nations have opened their doors to these most recent refugees from tyranny. In this humanitarian effort our own nation must play its part." That pattern was repeated several times: those fleeing the Cuban revolution in 1959, as well as the boat people seeking to escape North Vietnam’s conquest of the south in 1975 (under the Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Act), were welcomed into the United States, while those fleeing other tyrannies were often out of luck. In 1980, the Refugee Act finally put refugees outside the regular immigration system, allowing for 50,000 refugees per year.<br />
<br />
In sum, the reactions we see today to the prospect of admitting refugees from Syria and elsewhere have a long history in this country. Americans have a history of both welcoming and refusing refugees. Today we face a choice: which of those legacies will we embrace? When I began working on this issue nearly three months ago, I had some hope that it would be the former. The events in Paris and San Bernadino—and more importantly, the generally fearful reaction of many Americans to those events—have left me fearing that Americans are more inclined to opt for the latter. What this overview of the history shows is that such fears have in the past been overblown, and Americans have often had great reason to regret their fear-driven, short-sighted overreactions. Nevertheless, that list of regrets looks likely to grow longer.<br />
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-51286713801236882812015-06-23T21:55:00.000-04:002015-06-23T22:30:09.133-04:00The Flag Needs to go Down. So Does the Lie it Represents<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Yes, it’s a symbol. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t matter. That
is <i><b>why</b></i> it matters.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Within hours of Gov. Nikki Haley calling for the removal of
the Confederate battle flag from the grounds of the state capitol in Columbia,
Wal-Mart announced that it would stop selling articles with that symbol on it.
The Republican Speaker of the Mississippi House said it was time to change the
state flag that contains it. Amazon and NASCAR have turned against it. The
acknowledgement that it deserves no place of honor may be contagious.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>But we should not—cannot—be satisfied with the removal of
the symbol. We also have a responsibility to combat the lie it represents.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>While Gov. Haley’s decision to support removing the flag is
undeniably progress, the way she and other elected officials couch their
new-found sensitivity to the insult this flag has always been to black citizens
is troubling. </big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>In her statement, Haley said: “For many people in our state,
the flag stands for traditions that are noble. Traditions of history, of
heritage, and of ancestry. At the same time, for many others in South Carolina,
the flag is a deeply offensive symbol of a brutally oppressive past."
There is room for both views, she said: “We do not need to declare a winner and
a loser."</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>That is where she is wrong. We <i><b>do</b></i> need to declare something:
the truth wins and the lie loses. Leadership—true leadership—does not create
false equivalencies such as this. Both views, she said, are reasonable. They
are not. One is in line with historical reality, while the other is the product
of historical self-delusion.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Symbols can be tricky. Meaning can vary from person to
person. But we’re not talking about a piece of abstract art in this case. We
are talking about a symbol of a specific historical entity. I cannot simply
declare that, for me personally, the Confederate battle flag represents say,
abolitionism. It was a flag under which men fought against the armies of the
United States government, in defense of a government that had as its central
tenet the preservation of slavery. That is not up for discussion or debate. (Ta-Nehisi
Coates has an exhaustive collection of Confederate leaders saying so, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/what-this-cruel-war-was-over/396482/">here</a>.)</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>In 1948, Strom Thurmond’s Dixiecrats waved it to show their
opposition to President Truman’s civil rights plank in the Democratic platform.
Throughout the civil rights movement, segregationists flew it to show their
devotion to Jim Crow and their rejection of racial equality. Rabid segregations
waved it in the faces of civil rights protesters, and Gov. George Wallace of
“segregation now, segregation forever” infamy proudly stood in front of it.
People who defiantly shoved that flag in the face of people marching for racial
equality still walk among us.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>In each of those instances, it represented a willingness to
fight to maintain white supremacy.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>The reality that many people refuse to acknowledge those
facts does not change them. </big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Those who still openly defend that flag are, fortunately,
diminishing in number. But the near universal meaning people attributed to it
in the past, we’re still asked to believe, is not the “real” meaning for its
supporters now. Now we are told the murderer “hijacked” the Confederate battle
flag. It’s not about slavery or segregation now, it’s about “southern pride.”</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>What does that term mean? One of the murderer’s friends recalled:
“I never heard him say anything, but just he had that kind of Southern pride, I
guess some would say…. He made a lot of racist jokes, but you don’t really take
them seriously like that.” For this friend, making racist jokes was a sign of
“southern pride.” Racism is only serious, it seems, when it leads to actual
violence. When it’s jokes and racial epithets, it’s “southern pride.”</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Even if we allow that today most white southerners would not
define “southern pride” that way, when one associates “southern pride” with a
flag that the overwhelming majority of black southerners find offensive, there
is a damning, unstated admission: their “south” is, of course, a white south.
It is not the south of slaves and their descendants. They were denied their
humanity under slavery, they were denied their rights under segregation, and
they are denied their southern identity by this definition of “southern pride.”</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Haley’s remarks say that the “southern pride” view is worthy
of respect. It is not. Only by denying the historical reality of how that flag
has been used—not by the one or the few, <i>but by the many</i>—can one view it as
representing anything “noble.” It is that kind of denialism that allowed the
murderer to believe that the flag called for his hateful violence. It has
promoted violence in the name of white supremacy throughout its history, but it
has persisted in our culture under the guise of a harmless “southern pride.” The
murderer did not hijack it, he did not “misappropriate” it. He made manifest--in
the ugliest, most awful way--what it has always meant.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>He tore the disguise off so utterly that even many of the
willfully blind could not help but see.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big><i><b>That</b></i> will be why the flag comes down.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>No one who has dodged this issue in the past, or openly been
on what is now clearly the wrong side of it, wants to have to admit having been
wrong. But some flag supporters have. The former radio host and speech writer
known as the “Southern Avenger” recently<a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/22/the-southern-avenger-repents-i-was-wrong-about-the-confederate-flag.html"> wrote</a>: “I was wrong. That flag is
always about race.” That’s the kind of honest reckoning with the past that we
need.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Most politicians, however, present this act of removal not
so much as a change of opinion but as a change of circumstances. They are
beneficently going above and beyond due to the extreme circumstances created by
this event. But this awful event did not really create new circumstances. It
simply made undeniable <i>what has always been true</i>. It has shamed at least some people.
They know what that flag means. But they still continue to indulge the
fantasies of those who insist it is only about “southern pride,” and tell them
that their point of view is a perfectly legitimate one.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>There is a price to be paid for indulging a lie.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>For 150 years, this nation has failed to recognize fully what
Frederick Douglass rightly identified in 1878 as the central truth of the Civil
War: “There was a right side and a wrong side in the late war which no
sentiment ought to cause us to forget.”</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>The nation’s willingness to indulge the “Lost Cause”
mythology of the defeated Confederates is one of the reasons that 150 years
later this mass murderer had no problem finding a false version of history (adhered
to by many people beyond the Council of Conservative Citizens and the Sons of
Confederate Veterans) that supported his vile racism. </big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>Taking down the Confederate battle flag is the right thing
to do—but not just because it stands in the way of unity at a time of
bereavement. It should come down because it represents a pernicious lie: that
the south worth honoring is a white supremacist one. Taking it down while
indulging the lie is still progress. But it nonetheless avoids the hard truths
that need to be spoken.</big></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>The cause of the Confederacy was not “noble.” The cause of
the segregationists was not “noble.” Neither deserves any honor or reverence.</big></div>
<big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><big>
</big><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<big>There is a right side and a wrong side in the Confederate flag
debate which no sentiment ought to cause us to forget.</big></div>
</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-61809670085543046422015-02-04T10:11:00.004-05:002015-02-04T10:11:57.052-05:00"There Was a Right Side and a Wrong Side": Art and Historical Memory<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
[<i>This piece was originally posted on <a href="http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153575" target="_blank">History News Network</a></i>]<br /><div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The last several weeks have given rise to much commentary on how drama presents the recent historical past. The films “Selma” and “American Sniper” both provoked passionate, even divisive, disagreement. To some extent, that may be inevitable, since both treat subjects in the living memory of many people.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
My recent experience in this area is rather different, concerning as it does long past events. Last weekend, I attended a local performance of “The Civil War: The Musical.” Everything about the production was top notch: the set, the costumes, the direction, the lighting, the singing. Yet I left the theater with a sense that the show itself was deeply flawed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
At the very beginning of the show, a voiceover sets the scene, discussing the firing on Fort Sumter, and ends by quoting Walt Whitman: “the real war will never get in the books.” This sets the theme for the whole show: the war was, first and foremost, the stories of the individuals engaged in it, the vast majority of whom never did—perhaps never could—record was it was truly like.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
As far as it goes, there is much to be said for this approach, the kind of “history from the bottom up” story rather than “top-down” history of presidents and generals. There is also a danger in it, however, one that the show inadvertently showcases.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The audience is introduced to three (mostly) separate groups of characters: white northerners, white southerners, and black slaves (called the “Union Army,” the “Confederate Army” and “The Enslaved” in the script). There is virtually no interaction among the groups other than the battle scenes between the two groups of white men. While I’m sure the creators of the show (Frank Wildhorn, Gregory Boyd, and Jack Murphy) had the best of intentions, this division serves a certain interpretation of the war—one that all too often did find its way into the books.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To the best of my recollection (and perhaps I missed something), the subject of slavery is never discussed by any of the white characters—none condemns it, none defends it. The northerners talk of fighting for Union and freedom, of course, but not the issue of slavery itself. The southerners talk of defending their land, their way of life, but don’t talk about slavery as part of that way of life.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The entire nation, north and south, was complicit in slavery. Northern business interests invested in and profited from it. Northern politicians made common cause with southerners to defend it. Some southerners, like South Carolina’s Grimke sisters, openly fought against it. But you’ll hear none of that in the musical. We hear no northern soldier talk with pride of fighting to free the enslaved; we hear no northern soldier speak with resentment about being asked to risk his life to secure the rights of people he considered inferior. Both types existed. We hear no southern soldier denounce Lincoln for wanting to make blacks his equal; we hear no southerner angered at the prospect of dying for the wealthy planter’s right to own human beings. Both types existed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The subject of slavery is, of course, addressed by the black characters, and one song that recreates a slave auction (“Peculiar Institution”), is emotionally wrenching. But in the larger context of the show, the institution of slavery primarily appears like an act of God, akin to a famine, a plague, a hurricane—anything but a choice made by human beings to enslave their fellow human beings. Even the slave auction scene ironically has that effect. We hear the crack of a whip and a woman recoils from the blow. Theatrically, it is a powerful moment. It has, however, the inadvertent effect of removing any human agency from the whipping. We see the human being on the receiving end, but no human being administers the punishment.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
That’s the problem: in this show, no one is to blame. Everyone acts honorably, fights bravely, dies nobly. Historians of the late 19th century will recognize this interpretation of the war. It is the idea that allowed northern and southern whites to come together and put the war behind them after the end of Reconstruction. It is also the one that abandoned the freedpeople to the depredations of the “Redeemers” who took control after Union soldiers ended their occupation of the Confederacy.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
As I noted earlier, the characters in this show are not famous—with one notable exception, Frederick Douglass. (He is inaccurately listed among “The Enslaved,” despite the fact that Douglass escaped slavery in 1838 and was a free man during the Civil War.) No doubt Douglass was used by the show’s creators to include his eloquent denunciations of slavery, and that is a welcome addition. But I could not help but think that the historical Douglass would be rolling over in his grave.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There was no greater critic of this show’s “no one is to blame” ethos than Frederick Douglass. In 1878, he stated the exact opposite, as clearly as is humanly possible: “There was a right side and a wrong side in the late war which no sentiment ought to cause us to forget.” Yet in his final decades, he saw sentiment prevailing over memory. “I am not of that school of thinkers that teaches us to let bygones be bygones, to let the dead past bury its dead. In my view, there are no bygones in the world, and the past is not dead and cannot die. The evil as well as the good that men do lives after them…. The duty of keeping in memory the great deeds of the past and of transmitting the same from generation to generation is implied in the mental and moral constitution of man.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
“The Civil War: The Musical” aims to capture the war that didn’t make it into the books by focusing on unknown individuals and their admirable personal qualities. But Frederick Douglass was right. We do ourselves no favor by remembering only the good and forgetting the evil that men do. The Civil War—the historical event—was the product of human choice and human agency. There was a right side and a wrong side. That’s the truth that all too often has failed to make it into the books—and this musical. </div>
</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-52709320283585532152014-12-17T22:59:00.000-05:002014-12-17T22:59:41.697-05:00Dick Cheney's David Frost Moment<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
[This post was originally published on the <a href="http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153549" target="_blank">History News Network</a>.]<br />
<br />
All of us who teach face a daily, daunting task: how do we take our subject matter—which we know from years of study to be terrifically complicated and nuanced—and make it accessible and understandable to our students, all while avoiding the peril of oversimplification?<br />
<br />
We all do our best, succeeding sometimes, failing others. We are eternally grateful when we find a key: that piece of evidence, that compelling argument, that helps us do our jobs. The most prominent example of that for my teaching is perhaps Richard Nixon’s infamous comment to David Frost about his actions during the Watergate scandal: "Well, when the president does it, that means that it is not illegal."<br />
<br />
That one simple sentence helps me communicate to students the essence of the danger inherent in the many complicated events that we call “Watergate”: Nixon’s sincerely held belief that as president he was incapable of committing an illegal act; that whatever he deemed necessary to security of the United States was, by definition, legal. It was a sentiment more consistent with the absolutism of Louis XIV than the constitutional principles that gave birth to the nation. What makes those words so powerful is that they come not from one of Nixon’s many implacable political foes, or from a historian interpreting his actions. They come from the man himself.<br />
<br />
Since the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s torture report last week, I’ve been struggling with how to synthesize the multiplicity of reactions it provoked. Then on Sunday, I saw <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-december-14-2014-n268181" target="_blank">former Vice President Dick Cheney on “Meet the Press.”</a> <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTXNjZJremwv0U3IICVxEg1W0JE4gZ1eFP_9EMbqsRvPBSV9J-6RyULoSpJLP6mxK6nbf_6EQIXlgSH1h1gkcCg4J34A5_bX3fCNg8htpbuCR0B2WiwxVWT7M9Ps6u4H2yQybQHzHjOlmC/s1600/153549-cheney-lrg.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTXNjZJremwv0U3IICVxEg1W0JE4gZ1eFP_9EMbqsRvPBSV9J-6RyULoSpJLP6mxK6nbf_6EQIXlgSH1h1gkcCg4J34A5_bX3fCNg8htpbuCR0B2WiwxVWT7M9Ps6u4H2yQybQHzHjOlmC/s1600/153549-cheney-lrg.png" height="168" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
Amidst all the dissembling, Cheney made one remark that struck me as his David Frost moment.<br />
<br />
Moderator Chuck Todd confronted Cheney with evidence that 25% of the detainees were innocent, and that one was physically abused so badly that he died. Cheney replied: “I'm more concerned with bad guys who got out and released than I am with a few that, in fact, were innocent.” When pressed about whether it was acceptable to abuse innocent people even to the point of death, Cheney said: “I have no problem as long as we achieve our objective.”<br />
<br />
Keep in mind, Cheney was not talking about the accidental death of innocents on the battlefield. Every war involves the accidental death of innocents, but just war standards command that every reasonable effort be made to avoid them. This was someone in the custody of the United States, who had done no wrong and was mistakenly taken into custody, whose physical mistreatment by representatives of the United States killed him while in custody. Faced with that travesty of justice, Dick Cheney could not even muster a perfunctory expression of regret.<br />
<br />
Confronted with an unquestionable injustice, Cheney says: “I have no problem as long as we achieve our objective.” That is the essence of everything wrong with the Bush-Cheney “war on terror.” It admitted no principle whatsoever as superior to the objective of keeping the nation safe. Fundamental human rights—even of innocent people—can be violated with impunity, Cheney asserts. Even after being presented with evidence that an innocent man was killed, Cheney blithely said, “I'd do it again in a minute.” The end justifies the means.<br />
<br />
That is the mindset of the authoritarian. Dictators the world over use that logic every day. Dick Cheney will never admit that the techniques he endorsed constitute torture—to do so would be to admit he is a war criminal. But he has now admitted, beyond any doubt, that he has the mentality of a torturer.<br />
<br />
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-22433479586133981682014-10-22T23:02:00.000-04:002014-10-22T23:02:04.718-04:00Can Obama Do in Iraq What Nixon and Ford Couldn't in Vietnam?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
[Originally published on <a href="http://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153518" target="_blank">History News Network</a>]<br />
<br />
Practically every American intervention abroad since the 1960s has prompted comparisons to Vietnam. So it was hardly surprising when on October 8, in response to President Obama’s decision to expand the campaign against ISIS into Syria, Frederik Logevall and Gordon M. Goldstein authored an op-ed in the <i>New York Times</i> that asked <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/opinion/will-syria-be-obamas-vietnam.html?_r=0" target="_blank">“Will Syria Be Obama’s Vietnam?”</a><br />
<br />
I’m not sure that’s the right question. The American concern over ISIS originated in Iraq, after all—an intervention that is now eleven years old. America’s air campaign against ISIS today reminds me less of the intervention that happened in Vietnam than the one that didn’t happen—in the spring of 1975.<br />
<br />
This past June, when ISIS suddenly broke through America’s collective effort to forget about Iraq and seemed poised to take Baghdad, it was easy to wonder if we were about to witness a repeat of the fall of Saigon.<br />
<br />
More than two years after the peace agreement that led to the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, a North Vietnamese offensive against South Vietnam met with little effective resistance, much like last June’s stories of Iraqi armed forces dropping their arms and failing to fight ISIS. Compare these passages from the <i>New York Times</i> coverage of the <a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9904E6DF1F38E43ABC4A51DFB566838E669EDE" target="_blank">fall of Hue</a> in March 1975 and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militants-in-mosul.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A6%22%7D&_r=0" target="_blank">Mosul in June 2014</a>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
“By the thousands, the people are abandoning Hue…. The armed forces are also moving out, some by landing craft, some in military vehicles, some bundled into trucks with family members, furniture and food. No one seemed in the slightest doubt yesterday that Hue and the rest of the north were being left to the Communists.”</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
“Thousands of civilians fled south toward Baghdad…. The Iraqi Army apparently crumbled in the face of the militant assault, as soldiers dropped their weapons, shed their uniforms for civilian clothes and blended in with the fleeing masses…. ‘They took control of everything, and they are everywhere,’ said one soldier who fled the city.”</blockquote>
The political reaction this summer also eerily echoed the reaction to events of nearly 40 years ago.<br />
<br />
In his <i>Memoirs</i>, Richard Nixon argued that he had won the Vietnam war and that American bombing of the North would have preserved the South Vietnamese government. It had survived for two years after the peace agreement. That meant Nixon’s Vietnamization had worked.<br />
<br />
“When Congress reneged on our obligations under the agreements,” Nixon wrote, “the Communists predictably rushed in to fill the gap.” Nixon had privately assured South Vietnamese President Thieu that violations of the peace agreement by Hanoi would be met with renewed American bombing. But in June 1973, the Church-Case amendment forbade funding for any military operations in Vietnam. “The congressional bombing cutoff, coupled with the limitations placed on the President by the War Powers Resolution in November 1973, set off a string of events that led to the Communist takeover.” The war was “lost within a matter of months once Congress refused to fulfill our obligations,” Nixon said.<br />
<br />
Henry Kissinger has also repeatedly argued that the peace agreement reached with Hanoi had secured the independence of South Vietnam, and that he and Nixon intended to use air power to thwart any North Vietnamese aggression against the South. But, he asserts, Watergate so weakened Nixon that they were unable to overcome the opposition of Congress. In a meeting with Singapore’s Lee Quan Yew on August 4, 1973, Kissinger said: “We have suffered a tragedy because of Watergate … We were going to bomb North Vietnam for a week, then go to Russia, then meet with [North Vietnam’s lead negotiator] Le Duc Tho. Congress made it impossible.”<br />
<br />
Lewis Sorley, in his 1999 work <i>A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam</i>, argued that “[t]here came a time when the war was won.” Due to the pacification efforts of Gen. Creighton Abrams, he writes, victory in in Vietnam “can probably best be dated in late 1970.” The countryside was pacified, and South Vietnamese forces were “capable of resisting aggression so long as America continued to provide logistical and financial support, and … renewed application of U.S. air and naval power should North Vietnam violate the terms of that agreement.”<br />
<br />
The argument that continued American application of its air power against North Vietnam could have preserved South Vietnam has been thus been a staple of Vietnam War revisionism.<br />
<br />
In June, <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/john-mccain-obama-lost-iraq-2014-6#ixzz3G3GGPQE6" target="_blank">Sen. John McCain made an argument</a> about Iraq similar to the one that Nixon, Kissinger, and Sorley made about Vietnam:<br />
<br />
"We had it won," McCain said. "Gen. [David] Petraeus had the conflict won, thanks to the surge. And if we had left a residual force behind, that we could have, we would not be facing the crisis we are today. Those are fundamental facts ... The fact is, we had the conflict won, and we had a stable government.” Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina added: “There is no scenario where we can stop the bleeding in Iraq without American air power."<br />
<br />
There are no do-overs in history, and no one can say for certain whether the renewed application of American air power after the 1973 peace agreement might have prevented the fall of Saigon—or if it did, for how long. But we are currently seeing why Congress sought to limit the executive branch’s options back in 1973.<br />
<br />
The fear then was that, despite the peace agreement, Nixon and Kissinger would continue to fight a war that the country overwhelmingly wanted to be over. Kissinger’s repeated statements indicate that they in fact intended to do just that, not just in Vietnam but possibly in Cambodia, too. The Church-Case Amendment was how Congress expressed the national consensus against reviving the war.<br />
<br />
Today, there seems little will in Congress to restrain the president’s war-making powers. If anything, the loudest voices have been those arguing for even greater military action. In response to such pressure, the president has already expanded the air war to Syria.<br />
<br />
Just last week, <a href="http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/10/12/mccain-isis-is-winning-and-were-not/" target="_blank">McCain argued</a> that “pinprick” airstrikes were proving ineffective, and called for further expansions of the war: “They’re winning, and we’re not,” McCain told CNN. “The Iraqis are not winning. The Peshmerga, the Kurds are not winning.” Thus, he argued, there was a need for “more boots on the ground … in the form of forward air controllers, special forces and other people like that…. You have to arm the Peshmerga … Buffer zone in Syria, no-fly zone, take on Bashar al Assad the same as we have ISIS.”<br />
<br />
McCain’s vision of a renewed, ever-expanding war is precisely what Congress in 1973 meant to prevent Nixon and Kissinger from doing. After nearly a decade of war, Americans had decided that the fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would not be a mortal threat to American security.<br />
<br />
Today, what stands between the United States and the full-scale revival of a war Americans thought was over is not Congress, but the president himself. Obama has repeatedly stated that he will not re-introduce American combat troops to Iraq, and he is trying to maintain a sense of balance about the nature of the threat: “While we have not yet detected specific plotting against our homeland, these terrorists have threatened America and our allies. And the United States will meet this threat with strength and resolve.”<br />
<br />
McCain, however, is doing the opposite, hyping the threat the U.S. Back in June he said: “We are now facing an existential threat to the security of the United States of America.” Last week he said: “it is a threat to the United States of America if they are able to establish this caliphate.”<br />
<br />
A September <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/08/politics/cnn-poll-isis/" target="_blank">CNN public opinion poll</a> suggests that Americans agree with McCain about the threat, while siding with Obama on the limits of the U.S. response. Ninety percent say ISIS represents a threat to the U.S., with 45 percent calling the threat “serious,” 22 percent saying it is “fairly serious” and 23 percent saying it is “somewhat serious.” (Two years after 9/11, in 2003, 49 percent considered Al Qaeda a “serious” threat to the U.S.) Seventy-one percent believe ISIS terrorists are already in the U.S. But at the same time, by a 61-38 margin, Americans oppose using American ground forces to defeat ISIS. <br />
<br />
ISIS has succeeded in making Americans think that Iraq matters again, and that U.S. interests require its defeat, but it has not yet convinced them that it is worth Americans doing the fighting and dying. That's Obama's dilemma. If air power is not enough, does he take the chance that Iraq (or Syria) falls to ISIS, or does he break his promise?<br />
<br />
In the spring of 1975, Congressional and public opinion meant that President Ford had little choice but to watch as the North Vietnamese Army rolled into Saigon. Nearly 40 years later, President Obama faces a far more difficult task: prevent the collapse of the Iraqi government (and, increasingly, the Syrian opposition) without fully reviving a war he spent years trying to end—all in the face of an opposition that is intent on proving that the Iraq war it supported was won until the president lost it.<br />
<br />
Whether Obama will be able to keep his promise not to send American ground forces back to Iraq is very much an open question. Having taken the first step to save Iraq by applying American air power—what Nixon, Kissinger and Ford could not do in Vietnam—it may be increasingly hard to resist subsequent steps if air power proves to be not enough.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-25339247356832344912014-09-09T00:00:00.001-04:002014-09-09T00:00:59.860-04:00Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics (Higher Education "Reform" Edition)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
Following this summer's <a href="http://www.transy.edu/le_seminar/goal.htm" target="_blank">seminar on the liberal arts</a> at Transylvania University, <a href="http://byrnesms.blogspot.com/2014/07/on-state-of-liberal-arts.html" target="_blank">I resolved to more consciously talk about the liberal arts</a> with my new crop of first-year students in my Humanities class this semester. Last week, we spent a full class period talking about their reasons for coming to Wofford, and Wofford's commitment to a liberal arts education. We'll spend two more classes this week discussing it. They should understand what they're getting into, I think.<br />
<br />
The beginning of the academic year always prompts some thinking about the purpose of education, even among those not engaged in it. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/opinion/sunday/frank-bruni-demanding-more-from-college.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss" target="_blank">Frank Bruni</a> has an interesting piece in the <i>New York Times </i>arguing that higher education has an obligation to challenge students: "college needs to be an expansive adventure, yanking students toward unfamiliar horizons and untested identities rather than indulging and flattering who and where they already are." I couldn't agree more.<br />
<br />
The <i>Times</i> also carried <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/opinion/is-your-student-prepared-for-life.html" target="_blank">another piece</a> that conveys the more dominant view in American culture: that college, first and foremost, is about getting a job.<br />
<br />
Ben Carpenter, vice chairman of the CRT Capital Group, argues that what is missing from college today is "career education." For Carpenter, it is not enough for colleges to provide majors geared toward professional pursuits, and to have Career Services offices. The college must also offer <i>courses</i> in "career training":<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
So what can be done to make certain these young adults are being prepared for life post-graduation? The answer is simple: Colleges need to create, and require for graduation, a course in career training that would begin freshman year and end senior year.</blockquote>
(Note to self: remind students to always beware whatever statement follows the phrase "The answer is simple.")<br />
<br />
The first thing worth noticing here is Carpenter's choice of words. He is clear about what his concern is: "how to get, and succeed at, a job." But the title of the article isn't "Is Your Student Prepared for a Job?--it is "Is Your Student Prepared for <i>Life</i>?" Throughout the piece, Carpenter uses the words "job," "career," and "life" interchangeably.<br />
<br />
It does not take a liberal arts education to know that those words do not mean the same things. Too often in discussions of education, we elide the differences, so when talking to my students last week, I made the difference explicit. A liberal arts education is meant to prepare you, I said, not just to make a <i>living</i>, but to make a <i>life</i>.<br />
<br />
I do not know whether Carpenter intentionally conflates "job" and "life" to confuse the reader, or if he honestly does not see a meaningful distinction between the two. Either way, doing so has the effect of perpetrating the idea that your job <i>is</i> your life and so college is only about getting a job.<br />
<br />
The second issue that got my attention was that Carpenter employs what seems to me the knee-jerk "reform" response to every perceived challenge in higher education: make it part of the curriculum! I have no problem with the idea that colleges should help students find post-graduate employment. Here at Wofford, <a href="http://www.wofford.edu/thespace/" target="_blank">The Space</a> is devoted to that project, and does a lot of good for our students. But it is not part of the <i>curriculum</i>.<br />
<br />
That's not what Carpenter is calling for; in fact, he denigrates Career Service offices as suffering from a "major disconnect" with students. He wants "a course," one that lasts for four years and is required of all students. Since Carpenter does not get more specific, it is hard to know whether he means a course every semester for four years, or one course a year, or one course that lasts four years. But he clearly is talking about making it part of the curriculum.<br />
<br />
It is self-evident that every new course requirement reduces the electives available for students to take to investigate their own passions or interests. The more expansive Carpenter's plan, the fewer academic courses students in it will take. It is hard not to wonder if that isn't part of the idea. If college exists merely to train workers, what do they need those electives for, anyway?<br />
<br />
Finally, there is the matter of the precise problem that is driving his proposal. At the start of the article, Carpenter states:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
According to a recent poll conducted by AfterCollege, an online entry-level job site, <a href="http://employer.aftercollege.com/2014/83-college-students-dont-job-lined-graduation/" target="_blank">83 percent of college seniors graduated without a job this spring. </a></blockquote>
In contrast, toward the end, he cites an example that suggests the efficacy of what he proposes:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
One year after graduation, 96 percent of all Connecticut College alumni report that they are employed or in graduate school.</blockquote>
One of the things my liberal arts education taught me is to look closely and carefully when someone cites statistics. On the surface, the difference seems stark: 83 percent with no job, 96 percent employed! See, the answer is simple! Certainly that's what Carpenter wants us to think. But a moment's consideration shows that he's doing the old apples and oranges comparison.<br />
<br />
The AfterCollege survey only purports to measure only how many students <i>reported</i> having a job lined up before graduation. The accuracy of that number may be questionable, since it was an online survey, and not, as Carpenter says, a scientific "poll." Second, the <a href="http://www2.aftercollege.com/2014_AfterCollege_Career_Insights" target="_blank">fine print</a> on the survey reveals that the respondents <i>not</i> just students about to graduate--a majority had already graduated, 23.38 percent were college seniors, and 12.25 percent were <i>juniors</i>. (Safe to say that few if any juniors already have a job lined up for after graduation.)<br />
<br />
The 83 percent number comes just from students still in school, <i>including those juniors</i>. For recent grads, the number is 76.3 percent. No doubt that's a big number, but it is not 83. In addition, since the survey was conducted between February 27 and April 15, 2014, some seniors who answered "no" in late February or March may well have had jobs by the time they graduated in May 2014.<br />
<br />
In short, it is <i>not</i> <i>true</i> that 83 percent of last year's graduates had no job at graduation, even according to this survey.<br />
<br />
Now let's look at the Connecticut College numbers. By contrast, they are not a mix of recent grads and current juniors and seniors. They measure an entire graduating class. In no way can that group be reasonably compared to the AfterCollege survey respondents. In addition, it measures the outcome for those students <i>one year <b>after</b></i><b> </b>graduation.<br />
<br />
A true comparison would require surveying only graduating seniors <i>right after</i> they graduated and then comparing the number with jobs to the number with jobs <i>one year later.</i> A year makes a huge difference in the job search, as does being out of school--I recall not feeling much urgency about getting a job until <i>after</i> I graduated. In my experience, most college seniors are preoccupied with either the successful completion of their degrees or enjoying the final months with friends they've known for three and a half years, or both. The job search gets serious after graduation.<br />
<br />
In addition, the Connecticut number lumps together the employed and <i>those who are going to graduate school</i>--those planning to attend graduate school of course do not have a job lined up before graduation. For all we know, a significant percentage of those reporting "no job" in the AfterCollege survey may well have had plans to go to graduate school.<br />
<br />
The Connecticut College program may well be worthwhile and do great good. But Carpenter's comparison is misleading. I have no idea whether Carpenter <i>realizes </i>that the comparison of the two numbers is misleading, but it is. I have to think if he had <i>direct</i> apples-to-apples comparisons that served his argument, he would have used them instead. But I suspect that they would not have been nearly as stark as the ones he uses.<br />
<br />
As I stated in my last post, the idea that colleges are miserably failing their students by not preparing them for the working world is simply not true. It is true that few graduates move seamlessly from college straight into their dream jobs. But the idea that somehow there is a problem so significant that students must replace some of their academic courses with "career training" courses--and that such courses will solve the problem in what is still an extremely competitive and tight job market--is just silly.<br />
<br />
But that's what passes for intelligent commentary on higher education these days.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-28727993708330144442014-07-29T14:43:00.001-04:002014-07-29T14:43:46.030-04:00On the State of the Liberal Arts<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
For teachers, one of the most enjoyable things to do is spend time being students again.<br />
<br />
So it was that I spent the past weekend at Transylvania University’s seminar on <a href="http://www.transy.edu/le_seminar/goal.htm" target="_blank">Twenty-First Century Liberal Education</a>, along with 18 other academics from a variety of liberal arts institutions.<br />
<br />
We all read hundreds of pages of material in preparation. In the span of 65 hours at the seminar, we spent two hours listening to formal lectures (and another hour discussing them), 10 hours in formal discussion sessions, and countless more hours informally continuing those exchanges.<br />
<br />
Yes, this is what teachers do in the summer for fun. And it was fun—as well as intellectually illuminating and invigorating.<br />
<br />
It was also sobering, coming as it did at a time when higher education faces plenty of public scrutiny and criticism, and when the liberal arts and liberal arts colleges in particular face charges of irrelevance.<br />
<br />
The value of this kind of intensive consideration of a topic is that it inevitably focuses the mind. Many of the issues we discussed have been bouncing around my brain for a while (sometimes showing up in this blog), but I’ve never considered them as intensely as I did at the seminar.<br />
<br />
Since I’m forever preaching to my students that the best way to figure out what they think about a reading or discussion is to write about it, I’ll attempt to do that myself. (All of the pieces I quote below are from the wonderful reader that the Transylvania seminar leaders put together.)<br />
<br />
For the historian, the easiest and most obvious conclusion to take from our readings is that there is nothing new about the liberal arts—or higher education in general—being under siege. It rather seems like a permanent state of affairs. That’s no excuse for complacency about its current challenges, to be sure, but it does help leaven one’s reaction to all of the apocalyptic warnings of the demise of liberal arts. This is not new: the liberal arts college has been through this before and survived. As Alan O. Pfnister put it in 1984, “the free-standing liberal arts college in America has been a study in persistence amid change, continuity amid adaptation.”<br />
<br />
“Continuity and change” is the essence of history, and the story of the liberal arts has seen plenty of both. The perennial debate seems to revolve mostly around the question of value and utility: What precisely is the value of the liberal arts? How do we determine that value, how do we present that value to prospective students and their parents?<br />
<br />
For clarity’s sake, the sides can be simplified: 1) the liberal arts have value that cannot be quantified and assessed in any meaningful way, but they prepare students to lead better, more meaningful lives; and 2) the liberal arts must demonstrate their practical value in concrete, accessible ways that give others outside the academy reason to believe they are worth the time and money expended in studying them. <br />
<br />
Since these are simplifications, few people are likely to identify with either without some kind of reservation, but I’d argue that at some point everyone concerned with the topic will end up choosing one as having primacy over the other.<br />
<br />
I choose the first. I am not unaware of the pressures being brought to bear to make college education ever more “practical” (read “directly applicable to post-graduation employment”) to justify its high price tag. I simply believe first causes matter and that something essential is lost when we, as another participant in the seminar put it, allow external rather than internal causes to determine what and how we teach.<br />
<br />
The second point of view, however, seems to dominate the field these days. <a href="http://www.wabash.edu/news/displaystory.cfm?news_ID=4679" target="_blank">Writing in 2007, David C. Paris</a>, professor of government at Hamilton College (and one-time participant in the Transylvania seminar) said: “the liberal arts and the academy in general need to make peace with, or at least acknowledge, the importance of the market.” <br />
<br />
I’ll meet Paris half-way: I acknowledge that the market matters. Despite his rather disdainful portrayal of the traditional liberal arts as appearing “esoteric and apart from real concerns” or “ornamental,” and of its defenders as not concerned with the “real world,” I am not oblivious to reality.<br />
<br />
But no, I will not “make peace” with the idea that the market should determine what and how educators in the liberal arts teach. Paris argues that “the liberal arts are threatened,” at least in part, by “too narrow a self-concept” among its practitioners. He writes that “promoting a good life recognizes that there are many ways of living such a life.” The latter is true. But it is not the liberal arts that are “too narrow.” It is the <i>market</i> that defines the good life in the most narrow way possible, i.e., by a single standard: the dollar sign.<br />
<br />
Our students do not need the liberal arts to tell them that money matters. The entire culture tells them that relentlessly. They cannot escape it. It is our job as educators to open them to some of the <i>other</i> possible answers to that basic question: “What makes a good life?”<br />
<br />
The liberal arts have a long history of addressing that question and advancing our understanding of the good. Liberal education has been a vehicle for addressing questions of inequality and oppression, empowering students to challenge the institutions that buttress those conditions, primarily through encouraging independent thinking. It has been a truly liberating force, and it has not achieved that by asking what the market wants from it.<br />
<br />
What message does it send about the answer to that fundamental question of the good when the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) resorts to focus groups of students and employers to tell educators what liberal education should be? Or when the AAC&U endorses and privileges certain educational trends as superior (“active” or “high-impact”) to others and justifies its prescriptions by noting that “employers strongly endorsed” them and that they will receive “very strong support from the employer community”?<br />
<br />
Whether they realize it or not, they are saying in effect: Let the market decide. They are abdicating their responsibility as educators to shape curriculum. They are buying into not just the language but the <i>values</i> of the market: if it is demanded, it must be supplied. <br />
<br />
David L. Kirp writes in <i>Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line: The Marketing of Higher Education</i>: “This is more than a matter of semantics and symbols.” When we use “business vocabulary we enforce business-like ways of thinking.” (Thanks to Transylvania’s Jeffrey B. Freyman for this quotation from his paper, “The Neoliberal Turn in Liberal Education.”)<br />
<br />
Though the proponents of this point of view often come from the progressive side of the political spectrum, they unwittingly are endorsing a decidedly illiberal view of education. As Christopher Flannery and Rae Wineland Newstad point out in “The Classical Liberal Arts Tradition,” the phrase “liberal arts” literally means the “arts of freedom” as opposed to those practiced by slaves. “Slaves are subjected to the will of others, mere tools or instruments of alien purposes, unable to choose for themselves.” So-called “practical” training was for slaves, and the liberal arts would ruin slaves for their role in society as servants to their superiors.<br />
<br />
Liberal education later evolved—particularly in the United States—into not just the privilege of the already free, but as a vehicle for freeing the young from servile status. As Frederick Douglass makes clear in his autobiography, the liberating quality of education was the reason American slaves were denied it: “Knowledge unfits a child to be a slave.” Liberal education equips students to take their places as equals in a free society, as makers of their own lives.<br />
<br />
But note how the AAC&U approached its call for reform in 2008. In advocating its <a href="http://www.nea.org/assets/img/PubAlmanac/ALM_08_03.pdf" target="_blank">“Engaged Learning Reforms”</a> (which closely mirror John Dewey’s practical learning agenda of the 1930s--it is nothing new), AAC&U president Carol Geary Schneider justified the plan primarily with a table showing the “Percentage of Employers Who Want Colleges to ‘Place More Emphasis’ on Liberal Education Outcomes.” Leading the pack was “science and technology,” with the support of 82%. Next came “teamwork skills in diverse groups,” with 76%.<br />
<br />
The clinching argument for Schneider is this: “these goals for college learning are strongly endorsed by the constituency that today’s students particularly want to please—their future employers.”<br />
<br />
That sentence, to my mind, lays bare the essential problem with the AAC&U approach: rather than strongly reaffirming the goal of educating students to think for themselves—the traditional goal of liberal education—the AAC&U implicitly admits that it has substituted the goal of pleasing their future employers. At the end of the day, how far is that from students being “subjected to the will of others, mere tools or instruments of alien purposes, unable to choose for themselves”? <br />
<br />
This vision of the liberal arts does not free students; it puts the liberal arts at the service of society’s economic masters. It is natural that economic fear in uncertain times leads college students to want to please future employers. That does not mean that educators should seek to assuage that fear by shirking their responsibility to provide their students with far more than that, or should bend the curriculum to meet the desires of employers.<br />
<br />
Schneider’s statement is not an isolated case, either. AAC&U’s LEAP program (Liberal Education and America’s Promise) published a piece in 2005 titled <a href="http://www.aacu.org/liberaleducation/le-sp05/le-sp05leap.cfm" target="_blank">“Liberal Education for the 21st Century: Business Expectations”</a> by Robert T. Jones, president of Education and Workforce Policy. Jones is not shy about how he sees the role of higher education: it “must respond to these trends by keeping the curriculum aligned with the constantly changing content and application of technical specialties in the workplace.” <br />
<br />
Note, education “<b><i>must</i></b>” serve the needs of the workplace. That which business does and wants, higher education must do—because, at the end of the day, education serves business. Education must submit to business’ “assessment” of how well it produces the “outcomes” business wants, it must get “continual input from both employers and graduates” <i>and change its ways accordingly</i>.<br />
<br />
Jones states that employers “are less concerned with transcripts than the demonstration of achievement and competency across a variety of general and specialized skills.” Knowledge, wisdom, perspective—none of these traditional liberal arts goals fit this account of what employers want. “Competency” in “general and specialized skills” is the aim. Today, “competencies” has become a common buzzword in education discussions, even <a href="http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/08/14/pennsylvania#sthash.noZt377t.dpbs" target="_blank">opening the door for granting academic credit for work experience</a>, and threatening to make the classroom experience virtually unnecessary.<br />
<br />
The new liberal education, Jones says, “now enhanced with practical learning [how’s <i>that</i> for product branding?] is the essential foundation for success in every growing occupation.” <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
Jones is smart enough to compliment liberal education, even as he asserts that it is, at least in its current form, wholly inadequate and must be altered to serve the workplace better. But his ultimate purpose could not be clearer: education must “make peace” with the market.<br />
<br />
Yes, there are substantial economic pressures on students today. Do we as educators, however, serve them best by surrendering our purposes to what prospective employers tell us they want? I say no. The question we need to ask is this: are the traits that employers say they want, and the means we are urged to adopt to meet them, wholly compatible with liberal education?<br />
<br />
Take one example: Schenider tells us that colleges should change curriculum to include more “experiential learning” such as internships and “team-based assignments”—the latter because 76% of employers want more emphasis in college on “teamwork skills.” <br />
<br />
Do employers and faculty mean the same things when they advocate “teamwork skills” as an educational goal? If employers next tell us we're not producing the correct "outcome" when we teach teamwork, will we be called upon to change practices once again? Is it not possible that when some employers say they want employees with “teamwork skills,” they mean people who will not rock the boat and bring up the less essential “ethical values” that the team might be violating? I’d suggest that the recent record of the banking and financial industries shows that we may be teaching too much teamwork and not enough ethics.<br />
<br />
It may not be coincidental that the two <i>lowest</i> priorities for employers on Schneider’s survey were “ethics and values” at 56% and “cultural values/traditions” at 53%. Would those who use such survey results to justify their preferred educational reforms also accept that the curriculum should not emphasize ethics and values, because employers don’t seem to care so much about them? Shouldn’t the low priority the employers placed on ethics and values suggest to us that perhaps their goals are not the same as liberal education’s, and make us at least question whether we should give priority to their preferences?<br />
<br />
A liberal arts education should empower students with a sense of perspective, but that is precisely what is sorely lacking in this debate. The AAC&U approach smacks of fear and desperation, but is the reality really so dire that we need to look to surveys of employers to tell us what to do? Yes, the price of higher education is high (though not as high as the sticker price suggests, since most students do not pay that price), and students and their parents have a right to expect that a high-priced college education will prepare its graduates for life—including the working life.<br />
<br />
But today’s sense of panic comes less from those realities than from a culture that reflexively and unthinkingly ridicules the liberal arts as impractical, simply because they do not immediately and automatically funnel graduates into high-paying jobs. Seemingly everyone from <a href="http://www.cartalk.com/content/quit-picking-art-history-students" target="_blank">Click and Clack on “Car Talk”</a> to <a href="http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/obama-questions-value-of-art-history-degrees/72073" target="_blank">President Obama</a> buys into the idea that the art history major won’t get you a good job. We laugh and nod knowingly when people joke that all that liberal arts majors really need to know is how to ask “Do you want fries with that?”<br />
<br />
But it is simply not true, as an <a href="http://chronicle.com/article/How-Liberal-Arts-Majors-Fare/144133/" target="_blank">AAC&U report </a>shows. It may <i>seem</i> true when graduation comes and that dream job (making, say, at least as much money as last year’s tuition cost) does not materialize. It certainly did for me when I was in that boat. But I see much better now than I did then. Thirty years down the road, the full value to me of my liberal arts education continues to emerge. <br />
<br />
The liberal education will not pay its dividends—either economic or otherwise—in one or two or five years. When we expect it to do so, we are unthinkingly adopting the short-run values of today’s market mentality, with its concern with the next quarter’s profit, not the long-term viability of the company (see, again, the banking and financial industries). When we then change the way we teach in deference to such illusory expectations, we begin to sacrifice what we have always done best in the service of a mirage.<br />
<br />
It is hard for liberal arts colleges to preach patience and perspective; perhaps it has rarely been harder to do so than it is now. But it is true: a liberal arts education has long-term value, value that cannot be reduced to income earned two or four years out, as the President’s “College Scorecard” seems to be intending to do.<br />
<br />
The fact of the matter is that ten or twenty or thirty years down the road, liberal arts majors are doing fine. True, they may not make as much as their cohorts in the STEM fields. Some may need a graduate degree to enhance further their economic well-being. But the traditional liberal arts curriculum does NOT condemn liberal arts graduates to a life of poverty, and we do not serve our students well when we buy into the lie that it does.<br />
<br />
When we accept that false narrative as true, when we contort ourselves and embrace any curricular reform that promises to make us more “practical” and “useful,” when we adopt educational practices for their branding or marketing potential rather than their educational value, we betray our fundamental mission: the education of our students for freedom, not for servitude.<br />
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-7116127836821254392014-07-22T17:00:00.000-04:002014-07-22T17:00:22.095-04:00Historically Moving<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
After more than four years doing this blog, I'm starting a new venture. History New Network recently invited me to blog on their site, and with this post, <a href="http://hnn.us/blog/153433" target="_blank">"Historical Humility,"</a> I begin.<br />
<br />
I'll still be posting my pieces here; probably a day after they make their debut on HNN. And I will continue to use this space for the occasional less historical and more personal piece.<br />
<br />
I'd like to thank you readers who have been following this blog--some since it began early in 2010. In retrospect, it seems that every time I began to wonder if it was worth the time and effort, someone would, out-of-the-blue, send me a nice compliment, or ask me when the next piece was coming. So thanks to everyone who did that.<br />
<br />
I just wish my Dad was still here to see the new blog. He was probably the biggest fan of "The Past Isn't Past." Nothing gave me more satisfaction than when he would drop a casual "I liked your blog post" into our weekly Sunday afternoon phone call. After he passed, I went on his computer to send a message to his contacts to let them know, and noticed that "The Past Isn't Past" was the first bookmark on his web browser.<br />
<br />
So, for that Great Web Browser in the Sky--and the rest of you, too--here's the bookmark for my new web home, <a href="http://hnn.us/blog/author/39" target="_blank">Mark Byrnes's Facing Backwards</a>.<br />
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-74969296384936916692014-07-04T08:44:00.002-04:002014-07-04T08:44:43.386-04:00I love the Fourth of July<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
(<i>Re-posted from July 1, 2010</i>)<br />
<br />
I love the Fourth of July.<br />
<br />
Not just because of fireworks (though who doesn't love a good fireworks display?). And not just because of cookouts (and, since you can throw a veggie burger on the grill too, who doesn't love a good cookout?). And not just because it gives me a reason to play two of my favorite songs, Bruce Springsteen's "Fourth of July, Asbury Park (Sandy)" and Dave Alvin's "Fourth of July" (though, seriously, this would be reason enough).<br />
<br />
I love the Fourth because of the Declaration of Independence.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_FwJQjGLTj9i_ExrY_GwIpwBkBpjYx4xgx7jDQXJflTtDy0AzPaHE00vt5KcnjDteqaXXMMavpjG0eXqsz5V8q8VBZorZ6Vkh-QYq_FL9WY5qjscPvOAqaTIkWWK3X9BWoMrcznFpyMwQ/s1600/20071018_declaration.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_FwJQjGLTj9i_ExrY_GwIpwBkBpjYx4xgx7jDQXJflTtDy0AzPaHE00vt5KcnjDteqaXXMMavpjG0eXqsz5V8q8VBZorZ6Vkh-QYq_FL9WY5qjscPvOAqaTIkWWK3X9BWoMrcznFpyMwQ/s1600/20071018_declaration.jpg" height="320" width="271" /></a></div>
<br />
It began sometime in my childhood. At some point, on some vacation, at some historical site, my parents bought me a facsimile of the Declaration. It probably tells you all you need to know about me that I thought this was a great souvenir. It was hard, brittle, yellowed paper that crackled when you handled it. For some time I thought all official documents were thus. So when, in the fifth grade, my classmates called upon me to write a peace treaty ending the Great Spitball War between Group 2 and Group 3 (a foreshadowing that I would one day study diplomatic history?), I insisted on taking the piece of paper, coloring it with a yellow crayon, and then crumpling it up in a ball and flattening it out so that, at least to my eye, it looked like my copy of the Declaration. <i>Then</i> it was official.<br />
<br />
Later, I eventually stopped wondering why there were so many "f"s where there should clearly be "s"s, and thought more about its content. Just about every American is familiar with the most famous passage about the self-evident truths. But there is a lot more to the Declaration. Much of it, the bulk of it really, is essentially an indictment of George III justifying the break. Reading it with an historian’s rather than<br />
a patriot’s eye, many of the points don’t really hold up. But my favorite part of the Declaration isn’t one of the well-known lines, or something obscure from the list of charges. It comes at the end, just a simple, short phrase, and it encapsulates for me what is best about the Fourth of July.<br />
<br />
When you think about it, July 4 isn’t really the most natural date for the nation’s birth. There are other turning points we could have chosen, for example, the outbreak of hostilities. Using that criterion, April 19, 1775, the date of the battles of Lexington and Concord, would be a better choice. Perhaps February 6, 1778, the date a great power, France, recognized American independence and entered an alliance with the U.S. that would help win the war, would be fitting. Legally one could argue that April 9, 1784, the date Britain recognized independence with its acceptance of the Treaty of Paris, was the true independence day.<br />
<br />
But we didn’t chose the date of a battle, or the recognition of a great power, or the acceptance of the mother country. We chose the date of a declaration. What does July 4, 1776 mark, after all? A decision. An intention. Not a change in fact, but a change of mind. Looked at coldly, purely as a matter of fact, the Declaration is an absurdity. The colonies declared that they were independent, but they clearly were not. The colonies were still ruled by royal governors appointed by the King, and were occupied by tens of thousands of British soldiers. But the declaration nonetheless boldly states, in the words of a resolution first proposed by Richard Henry Lee nearly a month earlier, that “these united Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States.”<br />
<br />
And it’s that phrase that I love: “and of Right ought to be.” The Declaration is not one of fact. It is one of what “of Right ought to be.” This country was founded with its eyes on the Right. Those men who signed the declaration were not always right. About some things, many of them, in many ways, were tragically wrong. But they knew the importance of what ought to be. And they knew that the most important date was not the one when men took up arms, but when they decided to do what was right. When it has been at its worst, this country has settled passively for what is, or what cynics said has always been and thus must always be. When it has been at its best, it has remembered to keep its eyes on what "of Right ought to be."<br />
<br />
Have a wonderful Fourth of July, and sometime between the cookout and the fireworks, think a little about what of Right ought to be. And then work to make it a reality. That’s what the Fourth, and being an American, means to me.<br />
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-46333703407314120262014-06-24T07:00:00.000-04:002014-06-24T07:00:10.747-04:00Maliki is the New Diem<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div>
Some people are talking coup d'etat in Iraq.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
David Ignatius <a href="http://www.usanews.net/politics/ignatius-the-plan-for-saving-iraq-begins-by-ousting-maliki-h26467.html" target="_blank">writes </a>that "President Obama sensibly appears to be leaning toward an alternative policy that would replace Maliki with a less sectarian and polarizing prime minister."<br />
<br />
The impulse to replace Maliki is understandable. Most observers of Iraq argue that he has played a large role in the growing sectarian divide between the majority Shi'ites and the minority Sunnis, and thus bears responsibility for the growth of ISIS in the north.<br />
<br />
The unstated assumption, of course, is that another popularly elected, plausible leader could have governed differently and guided Iraq into a functioning democracy, and that now, the fact that elections produced Maliki should not stop the United States from maneuvering behind the scenes to get a more able (read "pliable") leader in his place. Then the United States can go about fixing Iraq.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJmC4e_FoAThVg07VKZBOo6KA1jZheboZj3diiecKga9cZWEJLpgST_bdlFVrOg7ijnlqSrhg4oSY5UZzkUFqmtRLr9bbkSd_V4jzPXalNCbQp4LWyG8WZw2aEDqBRe_LAG5btJfvLyGeZ/s1600/Bush_al-Maliki_handshake.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJmC4e_FoAThVg07VKZBOo6KA1jZheboZj3diiecKga9cZWEJLpgST_bdlFVrOg7ijnlqSrhg4oSY5UZzkUFqmtRLr9bbkSd_V4jzPXalNCbQp4LWyG8WZw2aEDqBRe_LAG5btJfvLyGeZ/s1600/Bush_al-Maliki_handshake.jpg" height="229" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">President George W. Bush shakes hands with Iraqi Prime<br />Minister Nuri al-Maliki, July 25, 2006. Photo by <br />Kimberlee Hewitt, public domain via Wikimedia Commons</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Perhaps. More likely is that the internal conditions in Iraq produced the kind of leader Maliki became. If that's the case, then a coup to oust Maliki will do no good at all. Instead, it is likely to make things worse.<br />
<br />
There is certainly precedent for that. In the mid-1950s in South Vietnam, the Eisenhower administration sought a non-communist popular leader who would not be tarnished by associations with the departing French colonizers. It settled on Ngo Dinh Diem.<br />
<br />
For about six years, Diem seemed the answer to American prayers. He created a separate South Vietnamese government as a counter to Ho Chi Minh's communist North. He led a fairly stable regime that served American interests in the region.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyj_ip8tjqhH5uyqi40LBt3V0f_D0GymOvTReEYYKi4V5E0QUEgJJR3QdvITBosXfOO5vpGaCduXOFYrdCxRDbS1OVTyRYs5N6tJGx4hG2EjPemsKEsjQUj0I6EJ5cQEJR5yIfDxHAV53g/s1600/Ngo_Dinh_Diem_at_Washington_-_ARC_542189.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyj_ip8tjqhH5uyqi40LBt3V0f_D0GymOvTReEYYKi4V5E0QUEgJJR3QdvITBosXfOO5vpGaCduXOFYrdCxRDbS1OVTyRYs5N6tJGx4hG2EjPemsKEsjQUj0I6EJ5cQEJR5yIfDxHAV53g/s1600/Ngo_Dinh_Diem_at_Washington_-_ARC_542189.gif" height="255" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">President Dwight D. Eisenhower shakes hands with South<br />Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, May 8 , 1957<br />U.S. National Archives and Records Administation</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
But then in 1960, the National Liberation Front began its offensive against Diem's government. As pressure grew, Diem grew more oppressive, in particularly cracking down on the majority Buddhists. By the fall of 1963, the American embassy and elements of the Kennedy administration decided that Diem was the problem and needed to go. American officials sent signals to South Vietnamese generals who then ousted and murdered Diem and his brother.<br />
<br />
Ignatius effectively proposes that the United States do the same thing in Iraq today:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The people who will pull the plug on Maliki are Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani and other Iraqi kingmakers. The United States should push them to signal unmistakably that Maliki is finished…. Saudi Arabia wants Obama to announce that he opposes Maliki. It would be better just to move him out, rather than hold a news conference.</blockquote>
One can only hope that Obama resists such pressure. Things with Diem didn't work out well.<br />
<br />
In a <a href="http://whitehousetapes.net/clip/lyndon-johnson-eugene-mccarthy-lbj-and-eugene-mccarthy-assassination-dgo-dinh-diem" target="_blank">February 1, 1966 conversation with Sen. Eugene McCarthy</a>, LBJ put it bluntly. Kennedy was told, he said, that Diem<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
was corrupt and he ought to be killed. So we killed him. We all got together and got a goddamn bunch of thugs and we went in and assassinated him. Now, we've really had no political stability since then.</blockquote>
The political instability that followed the Diem coup was a major contributing factor in LBJ's disastrous decision to Americanize the war in Vietnam.<br />
<br />
The desire to replace Maliki is another example of the imperial attitude toward Iraq: America gets to decide when it is time for the leader to go. I have little doubt that if the United States determined to do so, it could mount a coup against Maliki. But as always, the question is: what then?<br />
<br />
As with the initial invasion, it is relatively easy to destroy. It is much harder to build. The United States can probably destroy Maliki if it so chooses. But can it build anything to replace him?</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-32620839908760183502014-06-22T07:00:00.000-04:002014-06-22T07:00:05.443-04:00David Brooks and Pottery Barn Imperialism<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
One of the reasons I continue to read David Brooks is that he is often unintentionally revealing. Since he is, I think, quite sincere, he does not indulge in clever subterfuge in making his arguments. Thus he sometimes lays bare what otherwise remains hidden behind what Andrew Sullivan last week (ironically) called <a href="http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/06/18/wolfowitzs-noble-lies/" target="_blank">"noble lies."</a><br />
<br />
In his <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/opinion/david-brooks-the-sunni-shiite-conflict-explodes-in-iraq.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss" target="_blank">June 13 column</a>, Brooks tries to lay the blame for Iraq's current travails at the foot of Barack Obama. Before American troops left in 2011, he writes:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
American diplomats rode herd on Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to restrain his sectarian impulses. American generals would threaten to physically block Iraq troop movements if Maliki ordered any action that seemed likely to polarize the nation.</blockquote>
After U.S. troops left, he writes:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Almost immediately things began to deteriorate. There were no advisers left to restrain Maliki’s sectarian tendencies. The American efforts to professionalize the Iraqi Army came undone.</blockquote>
Brooks never acknowledges the obvious (though unstated) assumption behind all of this: that Iraq could not be expected to function without the United States. It seems that Nuri al-Maliki (hand-picked by George W. Bush in 2007, by the way) bears no responsibility for indulging his "sectarian impulses" (and note that Maliki is ruled by "impulse," not thought or calculation), and the Iraqi army bears no responsibility for not being professional. It is all due to the absence of Americans, who of course, know best.<br />
<br />
Brooks says, quite without irony, that "Iraq is in danger of becoming a non-nation." It never occurs to him that a state that--according to him--cannot function without American diplomats riding herd and American generals threatening its leader might already be a "non-nation."<br />
<br />
Without knowing it, Brooks embraces an imperial role for the United States. It was America's job to control the Iraqi government, make it do the right thing. The United States should have stayed in Iraq for as long as it took. Leaving Iraq was "American underreach."<br />
<br />
Brooks also embraces the reflexive American-centric mindset far too common on both the left and the right in the United States: the idea that whatever happens abroad happens <i>because</i> of something the United States either did or did not do. An incorrect American policy of withdrawal led to this state of affairs. It necessarily follows that whatever is going on in Iraq now can be fixed by the correct American policy.<br />
<br />
Neither of those things is true. It is an illusion that Americans cherish because they think it gives them control over a chaotic world.<br />
<br />
The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 broke Iraq. Iraqis thus far have not been able to put it back together. Maybe they never will. The lesson to be learned from that, however, is not what Brooks would have us believe: "The dangers of American underreach have been lavishly and horrifically displayed."<br />
<br />
In the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, Colin Powell allegedly talked about the so-called <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/arts/17iht-saf18.html" target="_blank">"Pottery Barn rule: You break it, you own it."</a> The true lesson of Iraq is this: that American military intervention can easily break a country. It does not follow that American military intervention can just as easily <b><i>make</i></b> a country. Having disastrously bungled in breaking Iraq, Brooks would now have the United States once again bungle in trying to make it.<br />
<br />
What the United States must "own" is not the state of Iraq, but the <i>responsibility</i> for breaking that state. Those are <i>not</i> the same thing. Responsibility begins with not making the situation worse by repeating the original mistake.<br />
<br />
David Brooks, it seems, never learned that lesson. One hopes Barack Obama has.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-89984644151947554232014-06-20T07:00:00.000-04:002014-06-20T10:17:39.620-04:00Somebody Told Us There'd Be Days Like These<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
With chaos returning to Iraq due to the growing power of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in the north, the partisan divide over the American war there has resurfaced as well. Supporters of the war charge President Obama with losing Iraq because he withdrew American forces, while critics of the war <a href="http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/06/18/the-neocons-create-their-own-reality/" target="_blank">fume</a> at the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/opinion/charles-blow-the-gall-of-dick-cheney.html?ref=opinion&_r=0" target="_blank">gall</a> of the architects of that disastrous war now posing as experts on the region.<br />
<br />
Because the debate has been largely partisan, with Republicans and Democrats lining up rather predictably, there is a sense that this is <i><b>merely</b></i> a partisan dispute. It is not. Unfortunately, the partisan nature of the current debate makes it <b><i>seem</i></b> so.<br />
<br />
Rather than go back to the 2003 debate, I decided to look back a little further--to the first war with Iraq in 1991, and the criticism of the George H. W. Bush administration for its refusal to go "on to Baghdad." Those Republican foreign policy leaders defended their decision by predicting undesirable outcomes--ones which we are now seeing come to fruition.<br />
<br />
Re-reading the memoirs of Colin Powell (then Chair of the Joint Chiefs) and James Baker (then Secretary of State), it becomes immediately apparent that they foresaw today's events as the nearly inevitable outcome of a U.S. invasion to topple Saddam.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyBn5pMz18pt9WFOz1-Ee_zFSPQmDKwvh8_Ro6OKHNDZ9eDhpJqLYqiHak_mW6FmHf9qxKqej68arX6p0MO3xcadZFms_BEpFM-qvXa2lUSN4wGm5jjBmOqcii1dU-uklKEnXFmkSxv3Hs/s1600/BakerPowell2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyBn5pMz18pt9WFOz1-Ee_zFSPQmDKwvh8_Ro6OKHNDZ9eDhpJqLYqiHak_mW6FmHf9qxKqej68arX6p0MO3xcadZFms_BEpFM-qvXa2lUSN4wGm5jjBmOqcii1dU-uklKEnXFmkSxv3Hs/s1600/BakerPowell2.jpg" height="400" width="381" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, National<br />
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Gen. Colin Powell, Jan. 15, 1991<br />
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Writing in 1995, Gen. Powell quoted U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles Freeman, who wrote in a 1991 cable: "For a range of reasons, we cannot pursue Iraq's unconditional surrender and occupation by us. It is not in our interest to destroy Iraq or weaken it to the point that Iran and/or Syria are not constrained by it." <br />
<br />
Baker also observed in 1995 that "as much as Saddam's neighbors wanted to see him gone, they feared that Iraq might fragment in unpredictable ways that would play into the hands of the mullahs in Iran, who could export their brands of Islamic fundamentalism with the help of Iraq's Shi'ites and quickly transform themselves into the dominant regional power."<br />
<br />
Supporters of the war who now bemoan the growth of Iran's influence in Iraq have no one but themselves to blame. We were told it would be like this.<br />
<br />
The current situation--a stable Kurdistan, ISIS in control of much of the Sunni-dominated areas, Shi'ites rallying to the defense of their holy sites--portends the possible partition of Iraq, either formally or <i>de facto</i>. That, too, was foreseen in 1991.<br />
<br />
Powell: "It would not contribute to the stability we want in the Middle East to have Iraq fragmented into separate Sunni, Shia, and Kurd political entities. The only way to have avoided this outcome was to have undertaken a largely U.S. conquest and occupation of a remote nation of twenty million people."<br />
<br />
The United States spent eight long years doing just that, occupying Iraq to keep it together. But that was never a sustainable long-term prospect. It went on too long as it was. Nevertheless, there are some neocons today suggesting that the United States never should have left Iraq.<br />
<br />
Baker, who was known for his domestic political skills before he went to the State Department, knew that scenario was untenable: "Even if Saddam were captured and his regime toppled, American forces would still be confronted with the specter of a military occupation of indefinite duration to pacify the country and sustain a new government in power. The ensuing urban warfare would surely result in more casualties to American GIs than the war itself, thus creating a political firestorm at home."<br />
<br />
Twenty years ago, these Republican statesmen predicted the situation we now see in Iraq. They warned anyone who would listen that an American intervention to overthrow Saddam Hussein would have undesirable consequences contrary to American interests, regardless of any specific actions the United States did or did not take in pursuit of that larger goal.<br />
<br />
Keep in mind that they said these things would happen with<b><i> their</i></b> president in charge, with <b><i>themselves</i></b> making policy. They understood that there are forces that such an act would set loose which the United States could not control, no matter who was in office. They said all this long before anyone had ever even heard of Barack Obama. The idea that any specific act by the president is primarily responsible for the current state of affairs in Iraq is absurd on the face of it.<br />
<br />
That won't stop people from saying so. But it should keep the rest of us from believing it.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-58459420701723721572014-06-16T13:56:00.000-04:002014-06-16T13:56:01.094-04:00Leadership and Interventionism Are Not the Same Thing<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
Robert Kagan has written a piece in the <i>New Republic</i> entitled <a href="http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117859/allure-normalcy-what-america-still-owes-world" target="_blank">"Superpowers Don't Get to Retire."</a> In it, he bemoans what he perceives as America's retreat from its responsibility to preserve a liberal world order. Kagan argues: "Many Americans and their political leaders in both parties, including President Obama, have either forgotten or rejected the assumptions that undergirded American foreign policy for the past seven decades."<br />
<br />
Kagan is correct that public attitudes towards America's role in the world have shifted recently, but he dramatically overstates the case when he posits a break with a 70-year tradition. He seems to equate "leadership" with military interventionism. Americans have rejected the latter, not the former.<br />
<br />
What Kagan does not recognize is that the public's current aversion to military interventionism abroad is not only consistent with America's pre-World War II foreign policy, but with the golden age of leadership he praises.<br />
<br />
Kagan's fundamental mistake is to think that the American people embraced military interventionism during and after World War II. They did not.<br />
<br />
Americans have always been averse to military actions leading to large numbers of American casualties and extended occupations of hostile territory. In the two years before Pearl Harbor, Americans (even the so-called "interventionists") desperately clung to the idea that they could protect American interests merely by supplying the British (and later the Soviets) with the weapons to do the fighting.<br />
<br />
While conventional wisdom suggests that Pearl Harbor changed all that, the reality is different. Even after the United States entered the war, it was reluctant to launch military operations that posed the threat of huge casualties. <a href="http://www.humanitiestexas.org/news/articles/david-m-kennedy-world-war-ii" target="_blank">As David M. Kennedy has stated</a>, this American predilection to avoid combat with Germany's forces in France led Stalin to conclude: "it looks like the Americans have decided to fight this war with American money and American machines and Russian men."<br />
<br />
Even the major architect of the postwar order, Franklin Roosevelt, did not envision an America that would permanently station large numbers of U.S. soldiers abroad, much less deploy them on a regular basis. Yes, he did see the United States as the leading power in the new United Nations. But the point of having the so-called "Four Policemen" was to insure that<b> <i>the other three</i> </b>would be the ones to send soldiers to keep order in their respective spheres of interest. He imagined that the American role would be primarily in the form of naval and air power. "The United States will have to lead," FDR said of the UN, but its role would be to use "its good offices always to conciliate to help solve the differences which will arise between the others." <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/RooseveltChurchillStalinConferenciaDeTeher%C3%A1n--A_020732.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/RooseveltChurchillStalinConferenciaDeTeher%C3%A1n--A_020732.jpg" height="240" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">FDR, Churchill, and Stalin at Teheran<br />By Horton (Capt), War Office official photographer <br />[Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
As the historian Warren Kimball has written, at the 1943 Teheran conference, when Stalin pressed him on how the United States would comport itself as one of the policemen, "FDR resorted to his prewar notion of sending only planes and ships from the United States to keep the peace in Europe." In FDR's mind, the United States would be primarily responsible for order in the western hemisphere, a role it had played for decades.<br />
<br />
Even the so-called American declaration of cold war, the Truman Doctrine speech of March 1947, avoided the implication that American military forces would be deployed to uphold the doctrine. The speech simultaneously signaled to the world that the United States was both assuming some of Britain's responsibilities and had given up on the idea of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Truman explicitly stated that the aid he was requesting would <i><b>not</b></i> be military: "I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes." Truman presented aid to Greece and Turkey as mere money to make good on the far larger investment of lives and treasure during World War II: "The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain."<br />
<br />
The Korean War changed that by requiring quick American military intervention to prevent the collapse of South Korea in the summer of 1950, but when it bogged down into a stalemate after the Chinese intervention in November, the public quickly soured on the war. In January 1951, "49% thought the decision was a mistake, while 38% said it was not, and 13% had no opinion," <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/7741/gallup-brain-americans-korean-war.aspx" target="_blank">according to Gallup</a>. While those numbers fluctuated over the next two years, and more Americans thought the war was not a mistake whenever an end to the war was in sight, the American public in general did not support military actions that led to substantial American casualties and prolonged combat. The public's disillusionment with the war was one of the reasons that an increasingly unpopular President Truman decided not to run for reelection in 1952.<br />
<br />
The next president, Dwight Eisenhower, moved quickly to end that war, and, more importantly, instituted a foreign policy that had at its core the principle of avoidance of any Korea-style wars in the future. Rather than engage in limited wars in every world hot spot, Eisenhower determined that such a course would bankrupt the country. He preferred "massive retaliation": the idea that a threat to essential American interests would be met with a nuclear threat, not a conventional response in kind. Even when the French faced defeat in Vietnam, Eisenhower refused to intervene, and never seriously considered deploying American troops to Vietnam.<br />
<br />
While John Kennedy came into office criticizing that approach, pledging to "pay any price, bear any burden," the sobering experience of the Cuban missile crisis made him rethink that mindset. The cold war, he said in June 1963, imposed "burdens and dangers to so many countries," and specifically noted that the US and Soviet Union "bear the heaviest burdens." He spoke of the American aversion to war: "The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough -- more than enough -- of war and hate and oppression."<br />
<br />
While one may argue that Kennedy's policies led to the next American war in Vietnam under his successor Lyndon Johnson, it is also the case that Johnson sought to avoid a land war. Significantly, he looked first to use air power. Operation Rolling Thunder, the American air campaign against North Vietnam, was meant to forestall the need for American ground troops in large numbers. It was only after the clear failure of bombing to achieve American aims that Johnson escalated the war with more ground troops.<br />
<br />
When that effort too proved futile, Richard Nixon again returned to air power as America's main instrument to maintain order abroad. His Vietnamizaion policy tried to balance the withdrawal of American troops with the deployment of increased air power. The "Nixon Doctrine," announced that henceforth "we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." In other words, America's friends should not expect American troops to do their fighting for them.<br />
<br />
I'd argue that from Nixon up until George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq, that was American policy. Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all avoided open-ended military commitments of American troops (Clinton's air-only campaign against Serbia in 1999 is the best example).<br />
<br />
Only the first war against Iraq in 1991 challenged that trend, and even that war involved a longer preliminary air campaign than a ground one: five weeks of bombing preceded the ground campaign, which lasted only 100 hours. According to Colin Powell, Bush had the Vietnam War in mind when he resisted the calls of "on to Baghdad." Bush "had promised the American people that Desert Storm would not become a Persian Gulf Vietnam," Powell writes in his memoir, "and he kept his promise." Within two weeks of the ceasefire, the 540,000 U.S. troops began their withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.<br />
<br />
Even the American war in Afghanistan in 2001 was planned to keep the American "footprint" light, relying on American air power and the Afghan Northern Alliance to do much of the fighting. It was the invasion and prolonged occupation of Iraq beginning in 2003 that predictably soured Americans once again on the prospect of extended military engagements.<br />
<br />
In sum, what Americans are experiencing now is not exceptional, but rather normal. In the aftermath of extended, costly military interventions leading to the loss of American lives, the American people revert to their historical aversion to solving problems by fighting in and occupying foreign states. That does not mean the United States ceases to be relevant, or ceases to lead. It simply means that Americans have been reminded once again that not every problem can be solved by an invasion, and that leadership is more than a reflexive application of American military might.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-62829920420845035522014-06-12T15:24:00.000-04:002014-06-12T15:24:28.028-04:00Won't You Let Me Take You On a Sea Cruise?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/opinion/bruni-a-quiet-cheer-for-solitude.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss" target="_blank">Frank Bruni wrote a piece</a> in the <i>New York Times</i> the other day, urging politicians to seek more solitude:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Take more time away. Spend more time alone. Trade the speechifying for solitude, which no longer gets anything close to the veneration it’s due, not just in politics but across many walks of life.<br />It’s in solitude that much of the sharpest thinking is done and many of the best ideas are hatched.</blockquote>
Coincidentally, I was reading about how FDR came up with the Lend-Lease program to aid Britain before the United States entered World War II, which makes Bruni's point perfectly.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgjcaTgGjS0GgBfvYr-iZbZ8qer4-nC-wuL8OtScU_tfik2JKc4wxFpj2kRK03T6HX94HxVHef7PHsy8gjqK7crBdmsz2iib7pQ0-PWn0WI_tIc1KHV916oUKEbeFIxXIHW81hysebkXR3c/s1600/Screen+Shot+2014-06-12+at+2.56.43+PM.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgjcaTgGjS0GgBfvYr-iZbZ8qer4-nC-wuL8OtScU_tfik2JKc4wxFpj2kRK03T6HX94HxVHef7PHsy8gjqK7crBdmsz2iib7pQ0-PWn0WI_tIc1KHV916oUKEbeFIxXIHW81hysebkXR3c/s1600/Screen+Shot+2014-06-12+at+2.56.43+PM.png" height="200" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Film title from an earlier FDR cruise,<br />from an FDR Library archival film</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
After winning his unprecedented third term the previous month, on December 2, 1940, FDR set off aboard the cruiser USS <i>Tuscaloosa</i> for a two-week cruise in the Caribbean.<br />
<br />
Now, try to imagine the indignation today if Barack Obama slipped away from Washington (without any notice, no less!) for a two-week sea cruise.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsfYu8OWBNmguTOVEXKl8ihLeoq7fp9kbjEz7GUxj8BJeVISQ2_Ele5eQQfbtewnyb70RiP22YYb-YbTwlT9BOrKALYDEnW0wkgkNdmYbuoiCBQSdh57asY5Br1GaXgL3tU9be0574eFDg/s1600/Screen+Shot+2014-06-12+at+2.57.35+PM.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsfYu8OWBNmguTOVEXKl8ihLeoq7fp9kbjEz7GUxj8BJeVISQ2_Ele5eQQfbtewnyb70RiP22YYb-YbTwlT9BOrKALYDEnW0wkgkNdmYbuoiCBQSdh57asY5Br1GaXgL3tU9be0574eFDg/s1600/Screen+Shot+2014-06-12+at+2.57.35+PM.png" height="126" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">FDR's cruise was not hidden, but rather<br />filmed for use in Navy recruiting</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Not only did FDR not hesitate to take a vacation, he also did pretend it was a "working" vacation. He took a few close friends and advisors, and according to David Kaiser in his fine new book, <i><a href="https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/david-kaiser/no-end-save-victory-how-fdr/" target="_blank">No End Save Victory</a></i>, they "spent the two weeks fishing, playing poker, sunning themselves and watching movies in the evening." Though the White House tried to portray it as a base-inspection tour, FDR "boasted proudly after his return that he did not read any of the working papers he had brought with him."<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR_n9A3Stzj8DuoflAwKMjcLDvAt8i5wU_av-0qXJccjqeLnMfSMJA7A0rEorbGai_X4msAUpOzduCUeO_OurNHVfU22kPhvCrXMEdtSJ2nVJn4lpafEKwf5AgHnroPJaDplIJhU2A3pb2/s1600/Screen+Shot+2014-06-12+at+2.51.30+PM.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR_n9A3Stzj8DuoflAwKMjcLDvAt8i5wU_av-0qXJccjqeLnMfSMJA7A0rEorbGai_X4msAUpOzduCUeO_OurNHVfU22kPhvCrXMEdtSJ2nVJn4lpafEKwf5AgHnroPJaDplIJhU2A3pb2/s1600/Screen+Shot+2014-06-12+at+2.51.30+PM.png" height="193" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">FDR fishing during a February 1940 southern cruise</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
That did not mean, however, that this was unproductive time.<br />
<br />
FDR did read at least one item of business, what Winston Churchill called one of the most important letters he ever wrote--an appeal for the United States to drop its "cash and carry" requirement on aid to Britain because Britain no longer had the cash to pay.<br />
<br />
Churchill later wrote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Harry Hopkins [one of FDR's companions on the trip] told me later that Mr Roosevelt read and re-read this letter as he sat alone on his deck chair, and that for two days he did not seem to have reached any clear conclusion. He was plunged in intense thought, and brooded silently.</blockquote>
Hopkins said:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
I didn't know for quite awhile what he was thinking about, but then--I began to get the idea that he was refueling, the way he so often does when he seems to be resting and care-free. So I didn't ask him any questions. Then, one evening, he suddenly came out with it--the whole program.</blockquote>
Two things are key here--FDR's own understanding that he needed to occasionally "refuel" in order to do his job well, and the understanding of his close friend and advisor Hopkins that FDR needed to be left alone to think. He allowed his boss the time to brood silently.<br />
<br />
Could there be a better riposte to today's obsession with being busy for the sake of being busy, meeting for the sake of meeting? None of us bear the tremendous burdens that FDR had at the time--a world war to navigate the nation through--yet we are so prone to exaggerate our own importance and pose as too busy to "waste" time.<br />
<br />
FDR was wiser. There was nothing wasteful about his sea cruise vacation. It was an investment, and one that paid off for the entire world.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-59969012989757563132014-05-14T11:45:00.000-04:002014-05-14T11:45:43.341-04:00"God Save Me From My Friends"<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
I've often used this space to bemoan the absence of the spirit of compromise in American politics. Not everything is a matter of principle, and political leaders do not serve us well when they act as if everything is.<br />
<br />
That does not mean that compromise is always the right response to every question, however.<br />
<br />
Yesterday's South Carolina Senate deal on the USC-Upstate and College of Charleston book controversy is a case in point. Some members of the state legislature (particularly in the House), angered by required readings dealing with LBGT issues at the two institutions, have tried to punish them by cutting their state funding by the amount spent on the reading programs.<br />
<br />
The Senate <a href="http://www.thestate.com/2014/05/13/3445261/usc-upstate-cuts-center-tied-to.html?sp=%2F99%2F205%2F&ihp=1#storylink=cpy" target="_blank">"compromise"</a> was to restore the funding, but at the same time demand that the institutions spent that much money on teaching the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Federalist Papers, and other founding documents. In addition, it required that students be allowed in the future to opt out of a reading if they object to the subject matter “based on a sincerely held religious, moral, or cultural belief.”<br />
<br />
While some supporters of academic freedom hailed the compromise as a qualified success for avoiding the punitive cuts, I see it as a surrender of principle.<br />
<br />
The point was not simply to avoid financial punishment for an education choice--it was to uphold the principle that educators must be free to assign reading material they deem to be well-suited to their educational purposes. Both "compromise" measures violate that basic principle.<br />
<br />
The first part does so by effectively restoring the money cut on the condition that it be used for purposes determined by the state legislature. The worthiness of studying the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Federalist Papers, and other founding documents is not the issue. I happily teach them in my American history classes. The fundamental question is: who decides? In that crucial matter, the putative supporters of the institutions under attack actually give the same answer as those attacking them: the state legislature decides. The only difference is that rather than dictating which material should <b><i>not</i></b> be taught by punishing the institutions for assigning it, they dictate which material <i><b>must</b></i> be taught. In both cases, they remove the essential power to make the judgment about academic content of assignments from educators.<br />
<br />
The second part similarly undermines the authority of educators. No one can reasonably judge whether or not a student's objection to subject matter is the product of a "sincerely held … belief." Of necessity, all students must be taken at their word if they say so. This then means that every student has been issued a veto power over content. This proviso amounts to granting every student the right to not have a belief challenged. The entire academic enterprise hinges on the ability of educators to subject ideas to critical analysis. If a student may say "my sincerely held belief may not be scrutinized, I refuse to read something that might challenge my beliefs," then educators are forced to teach with their hands tied.<br />
<br />
I don't doubt that this "compromise" was legislatively necessary to avoid Senate approval of the budget cuts. The money was kept in the budget by the slimmest of margins: 22-21. It seems likely that some fearful senators were convinced to support the restoration of the money only on the condition that they would then be given the chance to vote for mandating the teaching of the founding documents and giving students the opt-out power.<br />
<br />
I'm sure those who crafted and supported the compromise in order to maintain the funding think that they served the cause of academic freedom, but they did not. If forced to choose between the bigoted and ignorant idea of punishing institutions of higher education for the content they assign, and the allegedly "reasonable" idea that led to this compromise, I'd prefer the former. It is open, honest, and straightforward in its opposition to academic freedom. However well-intentioned the compromisers were, they actually showed that they don't understand the principle of academic freedom, and in trying to serve it, they actually undermined it.<br />
<br />
The whole thing reminds me of a proverb: "God save me from my friends. I can protect myself from my enemies."</div>
<br /></div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-41915213683672992042014-04-10T15:51:00.000-04:002014-04-10T15:58:05.418-04:00"A Sweet Fool"<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"Dost thou know the difference, my boy, between a bitter fool and a sweet fool?"--the Fool, in Shakespeare's "King Lear"</i></blockquote>
<br />
Stephen Colbert is leaving "The Colbert Report" to take over David Letterman's slot on "The Late Show" on CBS.<br />
<br />
I don't normally post about TV, but then again, this isn't a post about TV. It's about the value of satire in a democracy.<br />
<br />
As an avid fan of "The Daily Show," going all the way back to the not-at-all lamented Craig Kilborn days, I can remember when Colbert was "the new guy." (Most people have forgotten that Colbert actually preceded Jon Stewart on TDS by two years.) I had always liked him, but never as much as when he developed the Bill O'Reilly-esque persona for which he is now famous.<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzir_uDcjBdMG5ENoX5Ze0ElQw5P5vcItza3kQvpo8M8nvKbfnKohdM1VuFP-_5svaJuQ0byTIsnikv_bYOUE5XeXpBdKchOfWDXTEDSRzxGWilcBgWtQ89TGqvNW4U28sxEZBFr7vBg93/s1600/564px-Stephen_Colbert_by_David_Shankbone.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzir_uDcjBdMG5ENoX5Ze0ElQw5P5vcItza3kQvpo8M8nvKbfnKohdM1VuFP-_5svaJuQ0byTIsnikv_bYOUE5XeXpBdKchOfWDXTEDSRzxGWilcBgWtQ89TGqvNW4U28sxEZBFr7vBg93/s1600/564px-Stephen_Colbert_by_David_Shankbone.jpg" height="320" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">By David Shankbone, via Wikimedia Commons</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
I've been a devoted fan of the show. I may not have seen every episode, but I've probably come close (and may in fact have seen 100% since I got a DVR). What I've enjoyed the most is the relish Colbert takes in his satire. His talents (and those of his writers) have created what I consider to be the best satirical character in modern American history.<br />
<br />
That's why this career move gives me pause.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.salon.com/2014/04/09/why_stephen_colbert_is_dangerous_and_invaluable/" target="_blank">Joan Walsh published a nice piece</a> just the day before the announcement about Colbert's value to the progressive movement. That's true, but I'd go further. He is valuable to our democracy.<br />
<br />
Humor, particularly sharply satirical humor, is incompatible with the totalitarian mind. It punctures holes in the immense pretensions of totalitarians. One of the lesser-acknowledged attributes shared by totalitarians of the right and left alike is their humorlessness. They are so deadly serious about not only their ideas but themselves that they cannot abide any mockery. As O'Brien says to Winston Smith in George Orwell's <i>1984</i>, under Big Brother "[t]here will be no laughter, except the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy."<br />
<br />
By contrast, I think you can judge the health of a democracy by the extent of its self-mocking humor. The liberalism born in the 18th century had as a cornerstone its openness to critique--an acknowledgement that, however well-thought out one may believe a position to be, it is always subject to argument and new evidence--and mockery, which in the form of satire is, itself, a kind of argument that exposes unfounded assumptions and unacknowledged hypocrisy.<br />
<br />
Colbert's satire has always been at the expense of the powerful, not of the "defeated enemy." Americans, at their best, have always seen their leaders as fit subjects for mockery. It is one of the ways we remind them that they are, after all, just like us: no better or worse, just temporarily entrusted with power. We have often loved best those leaders who show they have a sense of humor, especially of the self-deprecating kind (Lincoln most of all, FDR to a lesser extent), while judging harshly those who appear humorless (see Herbert Hoover and Richard Nixon in particular).<br />
<br />
But at the same time, Americans have also been--at least to my mind--insufficiently appreciative of good satire. Ever since the <a href="http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1291&dat=19780125&id=K-tYAAAAIBAJ&sjid=mowDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6952,4119502" target="_blank">ridiculous controversy</a> over Randy Newman's "Short People" in 1978, it's been clear to me if the general public could not see that Newman's song was meant to satirize prejudice, America must suffer from a severe irony-deficiency. That's why I've been so heartened by the success of Colbert's right-wing pundit character. People <i><b>got it</b></i>. That had to be a good thing.<br />
<br />
Now that this success has catapulted the real Colbert to late night network stardom, however, that satirical character will be no more. He's a smart, talented man. I'm sure he can and will do other things well, and succeed in his new job. But his gain is our loss.<br />
<br />
Colbert's combination of sharp intellect, courage, and human decency has made him ideal for political satire. (His <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWqzLgDc030" target="_blank">2006 speech at the White House Correspondents Dinner</a> remains, to use his language, the ballsiest act of political comedy I've ever seen.) There is a deep compassion for the weak, the downtrodden, and the suffering that informs Colbert's satire. No doubt that quality will continue to inform his future work. But in the satire of "The Colbert Report," it combined with the swift sword of his intellect in a particularly effective way. It is hard to imagine it will be the same when he emerges from that character and has to entertain the broad, irony-deficient expanse of all of America.<br />
<br />
He may prove me wrong. I certainly hope so. And if not, America is still the better for nine years of Stephen Colbert's brilliant satire on "The Colbert Report."</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8697060800242665861.post-66829081107608828472014-02-14T07:00:00.000-05:002014-02-14T07:00:10.984-05:00The Czech Balance<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
In the last dozen years, I've traveled in two communist states, China and Vietnam, but I'd never been to a former communist state before last month. Other than its beauty and generally rich history, one of the appealing things for me about going to Prague was its place in 20th century history, particularly the Cold War. I've spent a large part of my career studying and teaching about the Cold War, and I was curious to get a taste of how people who lived under its shadow looked back on it.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFbVSf-ehN6ex-CV6vITbKNykRWtEpnMpBdfWlYFodMW27_gQx5iTZkul9XTlP7Slrl5AzINVHfdBGt3WSGo6MXqs1_ijjWJ8_b56nvfLTd_L2oWOlHaOI0kKRqmksJFbyEOkJYt9Ht68-/s1600/MuseumComBrochure.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFbVSf-ehN6ex-CV6vITbKNykRWtEpnMpBdfWlYFodMW27_gQx5iTZkul9XTlP7Slrl5AzINVHfdBGt3WSGo6MXqs1_ijjWJ8_b56nvfLTd_L2oWOlHaOI0kKRqmksJFbyEOkJYt9Ht68-/s1600/MuseumComBrochure.jpeg" height="320" width="153" /></a>Thus, I was particularly looking forward to our group's visit to the Museum of Communism.<br />
<br />
I'm not sure exactly what I was expecting, but I wasn't expecting to be able to walk right past it without seeing it from the street. I should note for the record that I have a notoriously bad sense of direction, but in this case I was actually on the right street, Na Příkopě, and in the right place. But you can't see it from the street. The brochure helpfully points, however, that it is "above McDonald's, next to Casino."<br />
<br />
That was my first clue that this would be no ordinary museum experience.<br />
<br />
Once inside, that insight was continually reaffirmed. The first thing one notices is the prevalence of Soviet-era paintings and statues of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. They had to go somewhere after the fall of communism, I suppose, and this is where at least some of them went.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhDElvkCpzF6cj5AMGG-9c5K29NqnV3heUb5hZ7ubi7PrA8inVSkdGcIVZaQ0UHUJPi3J-wTYfsHH374BOD9uC0jxOve4bEHYKKLXjg4meL0i8B3eAomMc11V42KdNeByS9xYrhAWMBzknC/s1600/100_1860.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhDElvkCpzF6cj5AMGG-9c5K29NqnV3heUb5hZ7ubi7PrA8inVSkdGcIVZaQ0UHUJPi3J-wTYfsHH374BOD9uC0jxOve4bEHYKKLXjg4meL0i8B3eAomMc11V42KdNeByS9xYrhAWMBzknC/s1600/100_1860.JPG" height="240" width="320" /></a>One of the more interesting aspects of the museum for me was its willingness to examine the role that Czechs themselves played in the communist regime--particularly in its establishment in 1948. Unlike Poland and some of the other regimes in the old Soviet bloc, Czechoslovakia did not immediately fall under Soviet domination after World War II. Czech communists did fairly well in reasonably free postwar elections, and were included in the government of Edvard Beneš, the Czech nationalist who served as president from 1940 to 1948.<br />
<br />
The Czech reality is that homegrown communists were largely responsible for the imposition of communism after 1948, and the museum does not shy away from that fact.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGsbsOkYvgHrMyufWlmXoGPFPA6s0j-EXr2kOozhYXHGupVnTnhgGfykl-Sl-yBn9xcPhMZPYhZUqu_wJxOj9oBiSVSScFAFdzvMHedtyvvN6OvtENWtjWIAljwfTGP63qd7QMA7er5jTl/s1600/100_1865.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGsbsOkYvgHrMyufWlmXoGPFPA6s0j-EXr2kOozhYXHGupVnTnhgGfykl-Sl-yBn9xcPhMZPYhZUqu_wJxOj9oBiSVSScFAFdzvMHedtyvvN6OvtENWtjWIAljwfTGP63qd7QMA7er5jTl/s1600/100_1865.JPG" height="240" width="320" /></a></div>
It is also impossible to escape the Czech sense of humor, which permeates the entire museum. One of its displays, for example, is a communist-era shop, with almost nothing but a few nondescript cans on the shelves. Apart from being historically accurate, this is a highly comic choice, and it draws some of its power from its humor. It reminded me of the comments our wonderful Czech guide, Helena, would make whenever we'd pass an example of what she liked to refer to as "socialist architecture": "Coming up on the right is something no one should see," she'd wryly say. "So please, close your eyes."<br />
<br />
The museum, like the Czechs themselves, does not play everything for humor, not at all. The re-creation of a secret police interrogation room and the display telling the story of the 1968 Soviet invasion make that readily apparent.<br />
<br />
But the humor is never far removed from the tragedy. It is that sense of balance--the knowledge that comedy and tragedy are not opposites but integrally related parts of life--that gives this museum its character.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQ0lY3zkZ8ed6QiSbaxCF1SN_FGQliexaD0Q7BzjItEHDRF_hdAxZDhu5RPpCV0zUThtEDzljwD016Fy1VMZ3FM5D8PahBUOZ__5-2G6b1d-pCbbsFMHxu1021Z-85Xu5OSZIaG8LK9e4y/s1600/100_1875.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQ0lY3zkZ8ed6QiSbaxCF1SN_FGQliexaD0Q7BzjItEHDRF_hdAxZDhu5RPpCV0zUThtEDzljwD016Fy1VMZ3FM5D8PahBUOZ__5-2G6b1d-pCbbsFMHxu1021Z-85Xu5OSZIaG8LK9e4y/s1600/100_1875.JPG" height="320" width="240" /></a></div>
The absence of basic necessities is no joke. Nonetheless, walking down a hallway, you pass this picture tucked away in a little nook. At first it appears to be a bit of socialist realist "art," but then you read the caption: "Like their sisters in the west they would have burned their bras, if there were any in the shops."<br />
<br />
Working my way through the museum, with its largely chronological approach leading inextricably to the amazing events of 1989, it was hard not to feel a touch of American triumphalism. You move from the dreary existence of the 1950s, through the brief optimism of the Prague Spring, only to see it brutally snuffed out by the Soviet invasion. You learn of the repression of post-'68 "normalization," and thrill at the rise of the Charter 77 dissidents and Vaclav Havel. Then the forty-year Czech nightmare comes to an end, and the people embrace the liberal values that the U.S. stood for in the Cold War.<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcxiMBeAt8lUMzqfs-EPjCEPvvqPiwGNElul2c5wIvffKsUhLa5TZ07Ax0choWPmJ06mZ4Cc-hkI_LtBcyWO0XfNAIMe41U563KZrnlBDiDhv5xFDgZwVm532_Trnur4oTYGpjk_NdOOt7/s1600/MofCPostcard2.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcxiMBeAt8lUMzqfs-EPjCEPvvqPiwGNElul2c5wIvffKsUhLa5TZ07Ax0choWPmJ06mZ4Cc-hkI_LtBcyWO0XfNAIMe41U563KZrnlBDiDhv5xFDgZwVm532_Trnur4oTYGpjk_NdOOt7/s1600/MofCPostcard2.jpeg" height="320" width="217" /></a><br />
Upon arriving at the gift shop and looking for some postcards to take home as souvenirs, I came across this one that seemed to capture just that pro-American sentiment. "We're above McDonald's--Across from Bennetton--Viva La Imperialism!"<br />
<br />
It's a funny card. It takes such glee in mocking Lenin, one of the original critics of imperialism. I had to buy one.<br />
<br />
I kept rummaging through the shop, and found a couple of collections of Soviet-era anti-American and anti-capitalist propaganda posters, spending far too much on them and rationalizing that I could make use of them in class one day.<br />
<br />
And I made one last purchase. Another postcard, but this one had a message significantly different from "Viva La Imperialism!" The two of them together tell, I think, a meaningfully different story than either one does in isolation.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaXrtx3SRW-Fv3yviueYE8vzZxHxT9byLyv4uMNfTdm_5kfoFBPjk0HmUXeGfJjDiiDtnIuwkqpc_OU_2sIKgd_gTG3Q81MMx9P3nWBSZfCvdA0Tws6_nRqWnQgQSk1qpyl1C0PaNH-6As/s1600/MofCPostcard1.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaXrtx3SRW-Fv3yviueYE8vzZxHxT9byLyv4uMNfTdm_5kfoFBPjk0HmUXeGfJjDiiDtnIuwkqpc_OU_2sIKgd_gTG3Q81MMx9P3nWBSZfCvdA0Tws6_nRqWnQgQSk1qpyl1C0PaNH-6As/s1600/MofCPostcard1.jpeg" height="320" width="223" /></a></div>
"Come and see the times when Voice of America was still the voice of freedom." Now <i>there's</i> a quick cure for the American tourist's sense of triumphalism. I have no way of knowing when exactly this card was first produced and therefore can only guess at what particular events or policies produced it, but there is no escaping its message of disillusionment with the post-cold war U.S.<br />
<br />
There was that sense of balance again. Even in a museum dedicated to demonstrating the failure of the ideology of America's Cold War nemesis, there was a refusal to indulge in a mirror-image worship of America's victorious ideology.<br />
<br />
What I took from the museum, what I took from much of the reading I did to prepare for the trip (in particular works by Ivan Klima and Milan Kundera), what I took from my admittedly brief and superficial exposure to the Czechs, is that it is the uncritical embrace of ideology--perhaps as much as the content of that ideology--that leads people to destructive fanaticism. If we take our ideas so seriously that we cannot laugh at ourselves and see the humor in the sometimes absurd manifestations of our own beliefs, that is when we lose our way. I'm sure that's not a uniquely Czech view of life, but I saw enough of it there to associate it with the lovely city of Prague. That, as much as the beauty of the city itself, is what I think I'll most remember.</div>
Mark Byrneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02022137257615203375noreply@blogger.com0